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ABSTRACT 
Communicating in the Department of the Navy (DON) over the Internet is an 
everyday event. The DON is developing the Navy Marine Corps Intranet (N/MCI) to 
enhance this communication capability. The security of communicating over the N/MCI 
has become a concern to the DON. The DON is relying on the N/MCI contractor to 
provide security for their communications. Key aspects of this secure communication 
will be provided through the use of a DON Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), which the 
N/MCI contractor is managing. To ensure the security of the PKI based communications 
the contract requires the monitoring of four PKI performance measures. This thesis 
analyzes performance measures, criterion, and standards then uses this analysis to review 
the contractual PKI performance measures and data collected from commercial PKI 
vendors. It recommends changes to these performance measures and provides additional 
performance criteria that should be included in the N/MCI contract. Finally, this thesis 
analyses how the N/MCI contract, specifically the PKI, impact DON members. 
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I.       INTRODUCTION 
A.      PURPOSE 
Communicating through the Internet is a common everyday practice that many 
members of the Department of the Navy (DON) perform without ever considering the 
possible security threats. In the near future when a member communicates sensitive 
material, it will be protected by cryptography that is based on the DON Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI). Currently, the DON is transferring most of its information 
technology infrastructure to a commercial contractor. The Navy Marine Corps Intranet 
(N/MCI) contractor will take on the responsibility of managing the DON's PKI, as 
required by the N/MCI contract. [Ref. 2] 
The N/MCI contract performance requirements for the PKI are described in 
Service Level Agreement (SLA) No. 34 which consists of four performance 
measurements: 
• Certificate Revocation. 
• Ability of one N/MCI user to obtain a certificate of another N/MCI user. 
• Timeliness of user registration for a DOD certificate. 
• Interoperability. 
These performance measurements were rapidly developed by the N/MCI program 
managers, so that the contract could be written in a short period of time (six months) and 
quickly issued as a request for proposal [Ref. 3] The N/MCI program manager informed 
this author that, due to the limited time-line, the set of performance measurements were 
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produced are based, almost entirely, on intuition and not on commercial standards. This 
was due mainly to the lack of available information in a fairly new area of security. [Ref. 
27] Since these performance measures were created quickly, this thesis will analyze 
them and compare them to performance measures from commercial PKI systems. [Ref. 
27] Finally, this thesis makes recommendations to improve these performance measures 
using measurements, criterion and standards developed in this thesis. 
With the entire DON shifting to a defense-in-depth strategy of information 
assurance, the DON is relying on PKI to be a major tier in this security platform. [Ref. 5] 
The importance of a properly operating PKI is understated and not reflected in the way 
that it was quickly written into the N/MCI contract. [Ref. 27] This thesis will emphasize 
the importance of ensuring that the PKI performance measures are complete and strong 
enough to create a secure atmosphere within the DON by analyzing them with 
measurements, criterion and standards developed in this thesis. 
B.       SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
The objective for this thesis is to determine if the current contractual N/MCI PKI 
performance measures are satisfactory when compared to performance measures from 
commercial PKI systems. 
An overview of the N/MCI contract is discussed first, followed by an analysis of 
performance measures, criterion, and standards. The results from this analysis are used to 
review the contract PKI performance measures and data collected from commercial PKI 
products.    Finally, impacts to the DON due the award of the N/MCI contract are 
discussed.   (Readers unfamiliar with private/public key cryptology and PKI can refer to 
Appendix A.) 
Research involved contacting commercial PKI vendors to determine how they 
measure the performance of their systems and what performance data they have collected 
for their systems. Finally, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR), 
who is in charge of monitoring the PKI performance measures, was contacted to obtain 
their insight regarding the quality of the contract requirements. 
C.       ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
There are six chapters and one appendix in this thesis. The first chapter gives an 
introduction to the thesis. The second chapter provides background information on the 
N/MCI contract. The third and fourth chapters are the analytical core of the thesis and 
answer the main thesis question. They present the results of the data collected during this 
research process and provide recommendations based on this analysis. The fifth chapter 
contains a study of the impact of the Navy Marine Corps Intranet on the fleet. The final 
chapter provides recommendations for future research in the PKI field. An appendix is 
provided with an overview of public/private key cryptography and PKI for readers who 
are not familiar with this material. The following is a summary of each chapter: 
• Chapter I - Introduction.   This chapter outlines the purpose of the thesis, 
thesis scope and methodology, and thesis organization. 
• Chapter II - Navy Marine Corps Intranet Contract. This chapter analyzes the 
details of the N/MCI contract and the shortened award. It looks at the area of 
coverage that N/MCI provides and the roles other government agencies play 
with N/MCI. 
• Chapter El - Performance Measures, Criterion and Standards. In this chapter, 
performance measures, criterion, and standards are analyzed. 
• Chapter IV - Performance Measures for N/MCI. This chapter analyzes the 
data collected using the characteristics developed in Chapter HI. It compares 
commercial industry performance measures to the requirements outlined in 
the N/MCI contract and generates recommendations based on this analysis. 
• Chapter V - Impact of N/MCI. This chapter discusses the N/MCI area of 
coverage and provides the costs and incentives the DON is paying for these 
services. It also examines the impact that the N/MCI implementation will have 
on the DON. 
• Chapter VI - Conclusion. This chapter completes the thesis by providing 
recommendations of future research of PKI in the DOD. 
• Appendix A - Public Key Cryptography and Public Key Infrastructure. This 
appendix provides a review of private and public key cryptography to form a 
basis for understanding a public key infrastructure. It also looks at the various 
components of PKI and how they interrelate 
II.     NAVY/MARINE CORPS INTRANET CONTRACT 
A.       GOAL OF THE N/MCI CONTRACT 
Vice Admiral Richard Mayo, Director of Space, Information Warfare, and 
Command and Control clearly defined the goal of the Navy/Marine Corps Intranet 
(N/MCI) contract when he stated to Congress, on March 3, 2000, that the N/MCI is an 
"effort to achieve the most efficient, effective, and secure networked naval community 
we can." [Ref. 5] To reach these goals the N/MCI contract was conceived, developed, 
and awarded to outsource Unclassified Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET) 
voice, data and video conferencing functions that the Navy and Marine Corps are 
presently handling themselves. N/MCI will also provide access points into the DOD's 
Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) system. 
The Navy states that their current system is inefficient and drastically impedes the 
sharing of information between Navy commands. Why? Under the current 
configuration, each command has its own independent systems and infrastructures. These 
independent systems have inadequate security measures and require extra resources to 
operate, maintain, and integrate with other commands. [Ref. 24] The Navy estimates 
that there are 477,900 data systems, 276,300 voice seats, and 490 video conferencing 
seats. [Ref. 25] 
Under N/MCI, one contractor is responsible to maintain all of these systems and 
the networks connecting them. The Navy hopes that this contract will allow Navy and 
Marine Corps personnel to [Ref. 4]: 
•   Quickly and securely share knowledge around the globe. 
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• Reduce cost of voice, data, and video services. 
• Eliminate interoperability issues. 
• Remove access, connectivity, and throughput impediments to productivity and 
speed of command. 
• Provide seamless migration and implementation of current infrastructure and 
applications into the N/MCI environment. 
B.       CONTRACTUAL ANALYSIS 
1.        Type of Contract 
The contract is modeled after commercial style contracts. It requires no research 
and development, which, from the author's experience, hinders most DOD procurements. 
The Program Executive Officer for Information Technology (PEO-IT) implemented a 
streamlined approach for fielding the N/MCI contract. The PEO-IT created working 
partnerships with the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV), the Department 
of the Navy Chief Information Officer (DON CIO), the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy for Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) and 
the Marine Corps C4I offices. [Ref. 3] From these partnerships, the Naval requirements 
were quickly captured and developed into the contract within six months. 
Most DOD contracts provide a product (end item).    The N/MCI contractor, 
however, will provide a service to the Navy and Marine Corps. The Navy intends to turn 
over significant quantities of their information technology (IT) equipment to the 
contractor, who will maintain and upgrade it as indicated in the contract.  The contract 
base period is five program years with an option for an additional three years.   It was 
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awarded as a firm fixed price contract with performance incentives. [Ref. 3]   These 
performance incentives strongly relate to the performance measures analyzed in this 
thesis and are discussed further in the Cost of Contract section of this chapter. 
2.        Award Determination 
The government received four bids for the N/MCI contract. The government's 
qualification for award was not based on the "Low Bid", as was the case in the majority 
of past DOD contracts. The winner was selected based on technical competence and the 
"Best Value" concept. The contract was awarded to Electronic Data Systems 
Corporation (EDS) of Piano, Texas for $6,938,817,954. The guaranteed minimum for 
the five-year fixed price is $4,119,790,353, and for the three-year option period is 
$2,819,027,601 ($4,119,790,353 + $2,819,027,601 = $6,938,817,954). [Ref. 26] EDS 
can receive an additional $1.23M a year in incentive pay if they provide outstanding 
performance. [Ref. 2] An example of this potential incentive pay is the management of 
the public key infrastructure (PKI). This thesis analyzes the performance measures used 
to determine the amount of incentive pay. 
C.       AREA OF COVERAGE 
The main purpose of the Navy Marine Corps Intranet is to provide services to as 
many of the Navy and Marine Corps personnel as possible.     The N/MCI contract 
provides service to the entire Continental United States (CONUS), Alaska, Hawaii, 
Guantanamo Bay (Cuba), Puerto Rico, and Iceland.    Because DON commands are 
dispersed across the world, they require a system that allows them to communicate 
securely.   The basis for this secure communication is the N/MCI (PKI).   This makes 
management of the PKI a key aspect of the N/MCI contract. 
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1-        CONUS Assets 
Presently, within the Navy and Marine Corps, each command operates their own 
Local Area Networks (LANs). These LANs connect to the government operated 
NDPRKET to provide connectivity between commands. The vision of the N/MCI is to 
incorporate local LANs into a larger Base Area Network (BAN) and then incorporate 
these BANs into a Metropolitan Area Network (MAN) as shown in Figure 2-1 As seen 
in this figure, a LAN is considered as an individual command located in a single area, 
such as a Public Works Center (PWC). Creating a BAN will entail connecting an entire 
base's LANs together. An example might be a Naval Amphibious (AMPHB) Base. 
Finally, the MAN will collectively connect BANs within a specified region. 
<3>®i 
Regional IT    ( N»«I ~~ 
ervice Center   ^"«"P^V Ser ice e ter 
(R1TSC) 
Figure 2-1. MAN & BAN. [From Ref. 15] 
These networks will then be tied together into a Wide Area Network (WAN) that 
connects Navy and Marine Corps commands in the Continental United States and five 
areas outside CONUS as outlined above. 
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2.        Deployed Assets 
Under N/MCI, the contractor provides and manages computer workstation seats 
used by depioyable commands. These deployable seats will interface with IT-21 
shipboard networks and the Marine Corps Tactical Network (MCTN). The entire end-to- 
end solution is seen in Figure 2-2. These seats can be reconfigured by IT-21 personnel 
for deployments and, upon return, the N/MCI contractor will reconfigure the system back 








Base Area      Metropolitan        Area 






&    • 
MCTN 
Figure 2-2. End-to-End Solution. [After Ref. 15] 
With the increased development of shipboard Asycronous Transfer Mode (ATM) 
LANs, the demand for shore IT infrastructure will increase as well. The N/MCI provides 
the required infrastructure to meet this demand. [Ref 15] This end-to-end structure 
significantly enhances security, improves interoperability and increases access to 
information. 
3.        Defense-in-Depth 
The DOD has decided to implement a Defense-in-Depth strategy to enhance 
Information Assurance (IA) within the military. The concept, as its title suggests, 
consists of layered security defenses that achieve the government's overall security 
objective. [Figure 2-3] Multiple locations within the network architecture provide 
functional security mechanisms. An example of Defense-in-Depth would be to have an 
e-mail software application wrapped with network protocol encryption. That result could 
be further protected by encrypting at the link layer. [Ref. 5] 
The government anticipates that PKI will provide an enabling infrastructure for 
much of IA throughout the DOD and has stipulated that all DOD users are to be issued a 
Class 3 certificate by October 2002. [Ref. 10] PKI is an important part of the Navy's 
defense-in-depth strategy. This alone justifies the necessity to ensure the N/MCI PKI 
performance measures are correct and to standard, and is the purpose of this thesis. 
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Interconnect     J to External Networks 
Figure 2-3. Defense in Depth. [From Ref. 5] 
D.       PAPERLESS CONTRACTING 
One of the goals of the DON is to create a completely paperless contracting 
system. A true paperless contracting system would provide the following: 
• Decrease the quantity of paper used in the contracting process. 
• Decrease the number of contracting personnel. 
• Create a more efficient and faster contracting system. 
The biggest concern in going paperless is accountability. To provide 
accountability contracts are digitally signed when transmitted over the Internet. The 
digital signature of a document obtained over the Internet provides a way of establishing 
unequivocally that an individual has signed that purchase order and prevents them from 
later denying the fact.   In essence, it is a contract between the sender and the receiver. 
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This thesis analyzes the performance measures involved in ensuring EDS correctly and in 
a timely manner creates and manages the infrastructure required for these digital 
signatures. Digital signatures are discussed in more detail in Appendix A. 
E.       GOVERNMENT AGENCIES' ROLES 
There is an extremely large number of agencies involved in N/MCI, with each 
playing some role in this new contract. Table 2-1 outlines the responsibilities of each of 
agency to give the reader some reference on how they impact the contract. 
Table 2-1 Government Agencies Connected with N/MCI 
SPAWAR - Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command - SPA WAR provides the 
actual post award contracting and program management. SPAWAR will provide the 
green team involved in verifying that the contractor is in compliance with security-related 
service level agreements. ________  
DISA - Defense Information Systems Agency - As discussed above DISA will provide 
long-haul voice, video and data network to EDS.  
NAVSEA - monitors the overall contract. 
FTWC - Fleet Information Warfare Center - FTWC will lead the Red Teams that will 
focus on general system vulnerabilities and evolving threats.  
NCTF-CND: Navy Component Task Force for Computer Network Defense - This entity 
monitors cyber intrusions against Pentagon networks.  
NSA -National Security Agency - NSA is the root certificate authority for the PKI of 
the N/MCI. 
The list in Table 2-1 was created from the information gathered in researching 
this thesis. It should not be considered inclusive of all government agencies involved in 
monitoring the N/MCI contract. This thesis analyzes SPAWAR's role in monitoring 
N/MCFs PKI performance measures. 
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III.    PERFORMANCE MEASURES, CRITERION & STANDARDS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter performance measures, criterion, and standards are analyzed. A 
performance measure is a variable that indicates the behavior of a system. A criterion is 
a threshold value of the performance measure that indicates the acceptable level of 
performance. A standard is the combination of a performance measure and a criterion. 
This chapter's content focuses on the necessary concepts for understanding measures, 
criteria, and thus standards. Specific standards are suggested for Intranets in general and 
the Navy/Marine Corps Intranet (N/MCI) in particular. Finally, standards from 
commercial PKI vendors are provided. 
B. PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
1.        Performance Measures 
Performance measures for an Intranet and specifically the N/MCI are discussed 
below. [Ref. 1] 
•   Meaningful - The performance measure must be relevant to the DON's 
overall mission and their goals. This is measured as follows: 
o   Time to revoke a certificate. 
■ Measure: It is measured from when a member informs the 
Certificate Authority (CA) that their certificate has been 
compromised and needs to be revoked, until the certificate 
is actually on the Certificate Revocation List. 
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■ Scale: Table 3-1 illustrates the probability of a command 
successfully completing their mission based on the amount 
of time taken to revoke a certificate. Note: This scale and 
the following scales are illustrations and should not be 
considered as factual. 
Table 3-1. Mission Success Based on Certificate Revocation Time. 
Minutes Probability of Mission 
Success 
lto5 100% 
6 to 10 75% 
11 to 15 50% 
16 to 20 25% 
20 and up 0% 
■ Criterion: If a command wants to achieve a 75% chance of 
having a successful mission, the certificate should be 
revoked within 6 to 10 minutes. 
o   Time to retrieve a user's public key. 
■ Measure: It is measured from when a user enters their 
request for the public key until the user receives the public 
key. 
■ Scale: Table 3-2 illustrates the probability of a command 
successfully completing their mission based on the amount 
of time taken to retrieve a user's public key. 
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Table 3-2. Mission Success Based on User's Public Key Retrieval Time. 
Minutes Probability of Mission Success 
lto5 100% 
6 to 10 75% 
11 to 15 50% 
16 to 20 25% 
20 and up 0% 
■ Criterion: If a command wants to achieve a 75% chance of 
having a successful mission, a user's certificate should be 
received within 6 to 10 minutes. 
o   Time to create a new certificate. 
■ Measure: It is measured from when a new user initiates the 
certificate request until the certificate is received. 
■ Scale: Table 3-3 illustrates the probability of a command 
successfully completing their mission based on the amount 
of time taken to create a new certificate. 
Table 3-3. Mission Success Based on New Certificate Creation Time. 
Hours Probabilitv of Mission Success 
lto8 100% 
9 to 24 75% 
25 to 72 50% 
73 to 120 25% 
121 and up 0% 
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■ Criterion: If a command wants to achieve a 75% chance of 
having a successful mission the new certificate should be 
created within 9 to 24 hours. 
o   Interoperability issues impacting the mission. 
■ Measure: It is measured by determining which networks 
give commands interoperability problems. 
■ Scale: Table 3-4 illustrates the probability of a command 
successfully completing its mission based on the ability to 
operate with other networks. 
Table 3-4. Mission Success Based on Interoperability Between Networks 
Cannot Interoperate With Probability of Mission 
Success 
Civilian Networks 100% 
DOD Networks 75% 
DON Wide Area Networks 50% 
DON Base Area Networks 25% 
DON Local Area Networks 0% 
■ Criterion: If a command wants to achieve a 75% chance of 
having a successful mission they need to be able to operate 
with DOD networks. 
■ Measure: It is measured by determining how long the 
command is not mission-capable because the system 
inoperable. 
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■ Scale: Table 3-5 illustrates the probability of a command 
successfully completing its mission based on the system 
down-time. 
Table 3-5. Mission Success Based on Time that a Command is Inoperable 
System Inoperable (Down- 
time) (in hours) 






73 and up 0% 
■ Criterion: If a command wants to achieve a 75% chance of 
having a successful mission, the system should not be 
inoperable longer than 5 hours. 
Responsibility Related - The performance measure must be taken by a 
department or other organization entity that can guarantee the data has not 
been modified. To ensure that the data has not been modified, the following 
three areas will be measured: 
o   The qualifications of the person performing the measurement. 
■ Measure: What are the person's knowledge, skills, and 
competence in taking Intranet performance measures? 
■ Scale: The scale in Table 3-6 is used to determine if the 
person taking the performance measure has the necessary 
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qualifications.    A Likert scale is used with numbers to 
measure the order of the qualifications. 
Table 3-6. Qualifications for Performing the Measurement 
Qualifications Scale 
Very Knowledgeable/Very 100 
Skillful/ Very Competent 
Very Knowledgeable/Very 75 
Skillful/Competent 
Very Knowledgeable 50 
/Skillful/Competent 
Knowledgeable/Skillful/Competent 25 
No Qualifications 0 
■ Criterion: To receive a value of 75, the person performing 
the measurement must be very knowledgeable, very skillful 
and competent. 
o   Does the  data from the performance measurement determine 
organizational and contractual incentives. 
■ Measure: What are the potential rewards to the measuring 
organizational entity as a result of the information obtained 
by processing the data collected? 
■ Scale: The scale in Table 3-7 is used to determine if 
gathering performance measurements provides an 
incentive. An incentive can be in the form of money or 
some form of compensation, such as time off.   A Likert 
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scale is used with numbers to measure the order of the 
incentives. 
Table 3-7. Type of Incentives for Performing the Measurement 
Incentives Scale 
Monetär/ Incentives 100 
Other Incentives 75 
No Incentive 0 
■ Criterion: To receive a value of 75, the person performing 
the measurement is receiving some form of incentive other 
than monetary. 
o   The person performing the measurement has the ability to collect 
the data. 
■ Measure: What is the person's ability in taking 
performance measurements? This ability is based on the 
number of years of experience performing the 
measurement. 
■ Scale: The scale in Table 3-8 is used to determine if a 
person has the ability to collect the performance 
measurement data. A Likert scale is used with numbers to 
measure the order of their abilities. 
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Table 3-8. Ability of Person Performing the Measurement 
Ability (Performed 
Measurement how many 
years) 
Scale 
Over 10 100 
5 to 10 75 
3 to 4 50 
lto2 25 
0 0 
■ Criterion: To receive a value of 75, the person performing 
the measurement must have performed this measurement 
for at least 5 years but not more than 10 years. 
Time Interval - The performance measurement is collected and reported 
within a reasonable time interval. The specific attribute is analyzed for: 
o   How often is the measurement is taken? 
■ Measure: It is measured by the time interval between 
performing sequential measurements. 
■ Scale: The scale in Table 3-9 is used to determine if the 
collection of performance measurement data is 
accomplished in a timely manner. A higher number 
indicates a more preferable selection. 
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Table 3-9. Interval Between Data Collection. 







■ Criterion: To receive a value of 4, the interval between 
sequential data collection is one day. 
o   How often are reports of collected data provided. 
■ Measure: It is measured by the interval between providing 
sequential reports. 
■ Scale: The scale in Table 3-10 is used to determine if the 
performance measurement report is provided in a timely 
manner. A higher number indicates a preferable selection. 
Table 3-10. Interval Between Reports. 






■    Criterion: To receive a value of 4, the interval between 
sequential reports is one day. 
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Credible - The data from the performance measurement is accurate and 
reliable. The specific attribute is analyzed for: 
o   Is the data accurate? 
■ Measure: Accuracy is measured by the size of the 
confidence interval based on a fixed confidence level. A 
smaller interval is preferable. 
■ Scale: Size of the interval. 
■ Criterion: If the data collected has the same confidence 
level, the data with the smallest interval should be the most 
accurate. 
o   Is the data reliable? 
■ Measure: Reliability is measured by the size of the 
confidence interval based on a fixed confidence level. A 
smaller interval is preferable. 
■ Scale: Size of the interval. 
■ Criterion: If the data collected has the same confidence 
level the data with the smallest interval should be the most 
reliable. 
Cost Effective - Is the measurement process efficient? The specifics are: 
o   Are there other ways to measure the data? 
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■ Measure: It is measured by the number of alternatives 
considered. 
■ Scale: Number of alternatives. 
■ Criterion:      Consideration   of more   alternatives   is  an 
indication of a more efficient measurement process. 
• Comparable - The measured data is evaluated with previously collected data 
under the same conditions and the definition of the variable is constant. The 
specific attribute is analyzed for: 
o   Have the conditions changed? 
■ Measure: Verify that the conditions have/have not changed. 
■ Scale: Yes or No. 
■ Criterion:    If the conditions have not changed the data 
collected can be used for comparison. 
o   Has the definition of the variable changed? 
■ Measure: Verify that the definition for the variable has/has 
not changed. 
■ Scale: Yes or No. 
■ Criterion: If the definition of the variable has not changed 
the data collected can be used for comparison. 
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The above criteria is used in the following sections to analyze the performance 
measures stated in the N/MCI contract. 
2.        PKI Measures Capabilities from Commercial Sources 
The concept of Public Key Infrastructures has been around for nearly 30 years, 
however, the actual commercial adoption of PKIs has accelerated within the last four to 
five years. This recent commercial interest in PKIs is due to the success of E-commerce 
as a daily tool. [Ref. 27] In conducting the research for this thesis, the author discovered 
that PKI's short history has not permitted the development of a large number of 
performance measures. This will limit the government's ability to measure performance. 
In addition, the deployment of PKI has been mainly in smaller businesses (relative to the 
Department of the Navy) where they do not routinely monitor the certificate revocation, 
certificate creation or any interoperability issues. [Ref. 27] However, the performance 
measures that have been developed are applicable to any scale of intranet operations. 
To obtain current data on commercially used PKI performance measures, twenty 
different vendors were contacted via e-mail. Only six vendors replied to the questions of 
how they measured their public key infrastructure performance. Vendors were 
specifically questioned on the four categories in the N/MCI PKI service level agreement. 
The Gartner Co., who specializes in collecting data to help organizations improve their 
business, was also contacted, but they could not provide any data on PKI performance 
measures. [Ref. 36] The following is a compilation of the performance measures that 
were obtained during the research for this thesis: 
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a.        Certificate Revocation 
The    actual    revocation    can    be    completed    by    the    Certificate 
Authority/Registration Authority/Local Registration Authority (CA/RA/LRA) within a 
few seconds for most PKI systems. [Ref. 29]. However, the actual certificate revocation 
list (CRL) update is dependent upon the transfer frequency of the CRL to the servers. 
For example the complete CRL could be transferred to all servers every four hours, with 
an incremental update every ten minutes. [Ref. 35] Below are the performance measure 
data collected from various companies for certificate revocation. 
CertCo Inc.: The CA can update the CRL within 60 seconds. [Ref. 29] 
Information Assurance Support Environment (IASE): As long as the RA has all 
the necessary information to identify the certificate and they have access to the 
directory, it should be within 30 seconds. [Ref 30] 
Litronic Inc.: The CA can update the CRL within 5 to 10 minutes. [Ref. 31] 
Netlock Technologies Inc.: This company refers to their CA's as managers and 
the certificate users as agents. When they revoke a certificate from the agent, the 
revocation is within 30 seconds, if the manager is online. If the manager is 
offline, the system will keep trying to contact the manager until they are online. 
[Ref. 32] 
Eccelerate.com: As soon as the end-user accesses their website and puts in a 
revocation request, the request is processed and the certificate is revoked. They 
do not address the issue of CRLs and the time required for the revoked certificate 
to be placed on the lists. [Ref 33] 
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Digital Signature Trust Co.: Revocation can be accomplished within 1 minute by 
calling their Help Desk or Registration office. However, the update to the 
certificate revocation list is only every 24 hours for their Interim External 
Certificate Authority (TECA) program with the DOD. [Ref. 34] 
b.        Ability of One User to Obtain a Certificate of Another User 
This performance measure is dependent on how users obtain certificates 
for other users' public keys. They can obtain the certificate either through an attachment 
in an e-mail, through a Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP), or through a key 
server. It is also dependent on whether the certificate is coming from directories that are 
shared between the two customers. [Ref. 29] Below are the performance measure data 
collected from various companies and commands in retrieving public keys. 
CertCo Inc.: Certificates can be obtained within 60 to 90 seconds, dependent on 
what method is used to provide public keys to other members. [Ref. 29] 
IASE: As long as the directory is available, a user can obtain a certificate within 
60 seconds. [Ref. 30] 
Litronic Inc.: Certificates can be obtained within 3 to 5 minutes. [Ref. 31] 
Netlock Technologies Inc.: This company refers to their CA's as managers and 
the certificate users as agents. Communication between agents to obtain their 
public keys occurs within 5 seconds. [Ref. 32] 
Eccelerate.com: Certificates can be obtained within 5 to 10 seconds. [Ref. 33] 
Digital Signature Trust Co.: Among the IECA vendors, these public keys can be 
obtained within 10 seconds. [Ref. 34] 
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c.        Time to Register 
The time it takes to create a public key certificate (and get a private key) 
depends upon the time it takes to enter the user information, and the time it takes to 
receive the private key securely. 
The length of time it takes for the requester to input the information will 
vary depending on if it is a web-based system or if an individual would have to physically 
go somewhere. Although all registration methods require user authentication at a 
registration workstation, there are different methods for generating and distributing the 
private key. The private key has to be delivered to the individual by some secure means. 
This could be through a rapid secure socket layer (SSL) web page or through a lengthy 
process of physically accepting the private key from the registration authority. [Ref. 6] 
Smart Card technology will provide a member with instantaneous 
certificate creation after the first-time-use of the card. The user will still have to 
authenticate their identity with the registration authority issuing the Smart Cards. The 
cards will be distributed through DEERS (Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting 
System) and will only take eight minutes longer than issuing the current DOD ID card. 
[Ref. 37] Below are the performance measure data collected from various companies for 
certificate creation. 
CertCo Inc.: Depending on what system is in place to qualify a member, it could 
take from 5 minutes to 5 days to create a certificate. [Ref. 29] 
IASE: It can take from 5 to 10 minutes from when the LRA uploads the 
information until the member receives the certificate. [Ref. 30] 
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Litronic Inc.: Certificates can be created within 5 to 10 minutes depending on the 
profile that you want to store on the individual. [Ref. 31] 
Netlock Technologies Inc.: This company refers to their CA's as managers and 
the certificate users as agents. When an agent is online while the manager is also 
online, it will only take 1 minute for an agent to receive a certificate. [Ref. 32] 
Eccelerate.com: They advertise that 70% of their requests are completed within 2 
business days. [Ref. 33] 
Digital Signature Trust Co.: It can take from 10 to 14 days to create a certificate. 
[Ref. 34] 
d.        Interoperability 
The companies contacted during this thesis offer a complete package for a 
single small enterprise. These standalone systems have very few interoperability issues. 
However, the DON will need to be completely interoperable with itself and other 
government agencies. Below are the performance data collected from various companies 
and commands for interoperability. 
CertCo Inc.: Their systems support the PKI X.509 industry standard, however, 
they will always try to accommodate any product. [Ref. 29] 
IASE: Their system will be fully interoperable with all vendors once they 
implement the Federal Bridge Certificate Authority (BCA). [Ref. 30] (BCA is 
discussed further in the next section. 
Litronic Inc.: Their system supports PKI X.509. [Ref. 31] 
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Netlock Technoloeies Inc.: Their system is operable with many industry 
standards. [Ref. 32] 
Eccelerate.com: Their systems support all the industry standards. [Ref. 33] 
Digital Signature Trust Co.: For the EECA vendors the program requires that it 
work only with Netscape. The applications that their PKI systems intend to 
support are the Defense Travel Service (DTS), Electronic Data Access (EDA), 
Military Traffic Management Control (MTMC), and Paperless Contracting Wide 
Area Workflow (WAWF). [Ref. 34] 
As indicated above, the PKI commercial industry provides very few 
performance measures for their systems. They also do not provide information 
concerning criterion of a specific measure. The performance measure data from 
commercial vendors was collected from test labs and not from testing their systems on 
customer's systems. PKI companies claim to provide information on how secure their 
program makes your communications, however, they do not provide complete 
performance measures on the issues discussed in this thesis. The author believes that 
these performance measures are not monitored by vendors, because the cost to perform 
this monitoring outweighs the benefits of the data collected. 
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IV.    PERFORMANCE MEASURES, CRITERIA, AND 
STANDARDS FOR N/MCI 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the application of performance measures for the N/MCI in 
Service Level Agreement (SLA) 34 Performance Measures for Information Assurance 
Operational Services, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). It provides a list of the 
contractual requirements for these performance measures. This chapter takes the 
contractual performance measures and analyzes them based on the characteristics 
outlined in Chapter HI. From the analysis, recommendations and the costs for these 
recommendations are provided. The last section analyzes how these performance 
measures will provide an incentive for the N/MCI contractor to perform at or above the 
contract requirements for PKI 
B. APPLICATION OF PERFORMANCE MEASURES TO N/MCI 
Measuring performance means setting the goal, measuring performance, 
comparing these two and choosing a corrective action. [Ref. 1] Performance measures 
are the standards the government will employ to evaluate the contractor's progress. SLA 
34 of the N/MCI contract consists of four performance measurements: [Ref. 2] 
• Certificate Revocation. 
• Ability of one N/MCI user to obtain a certificate of another N/MCI user. 
• Timeliness of user registration for a DOD certificate. 
• Interoperability. 
31 
The N/MCI contractor is required to supply the DON with data collected while 
taking or recording the above performance measures. 
1.        Basis of Performance Measures 
As indicated in Chapter II of this thesis, the Navy/Marine Corps Intranet contract 
was modeled after commercial style contracts. This was done so that the contract could 
be written in a short period of time (six months) and quickly issued as a request for 
proposal. [Ref. 3] This short-fused project did not allow sufficient time for the N/MCI 
program office to successfully research the performance measures required for Public 
Key Infrastructure systems. While interviewing the N/MCI program manager, he stated 
that his team could not find any commercial precedents for security measures, 
specifically PKI performance measures. The team had to work from common sense 
identification of measurable attributes in an attempt to balance what they expected from 
the contractor with what users needed in terms of responsiveness. [Ref. 27] The research 
phase of this thesis also discovered very few commercially available public key 
infrastructure performance measures. 
2.        N/MCI Contract Performance Measures 
Performance measures in the public key infrastructure section of the N/MCI 
contract are used to examine the ability of the contractor to properly and efficiently 
manage certificates, and determine how well their systems interoperate with other 
systems. Tables 4-1 through 4-4 show the four performance measures for Service Level 
Agreement (SLA) No. 34 "Information Assurance Operation Services - PKT. Each table 
contains the requirements for a specific performance measure that are the responsibility 
of the contractor. It indicates who is responsible for monitoring the category, how it shall 
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be measured, and at what frequency it is monitored. Each table also indicates three levels 
of service that every command may choose from based on their individual requirements. 
The levels of service are: 
Level of Service (1): Basic. 
Level of Service (2): High End. 
Level of Service (3): Mission Critical. 
The requirements in the following tables are analyzed in the next section to 
determine if these performance values are sufficient to meet the demands of the DON. 
Table 4-1. Performance Category 1: Certificate Revocation. [After Ref. 2] 
Performance Measure Description: Timeliness of revoking a certificate when required. 
Who: Vendor & Government Frequency: Continuous by vendor, random by 
government 
Where: Operations Center How measured: Elapsed time from notification of the 
NMCI contractor that a user certificate needs to be 






Pre-Negotiation Contract SLA 
Level of Service (1) 1 hour .  30 minutes 1 hour / 30 minutes 1 hour / 30 minutes 
Level of Service (2) 1 hour 30 minutes 1 hour/30 minutes 1 hour / 30 minutes 
Level of Service (3) 1 hour 30 minutes 1 hour / 30 minutes 1 hour / 30 minutes 
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Table 4-2. Performance Category 2: Ability of one NMCI user to obtain the 
DOD Public Key Infrastructure X.509 certificate of another NMCI user for 
purposes of sending electronic mail. [After Ref. 2] 
Performance Measure Description: Time required for users to successfully obtain on the first 
attempt the X.509 certificates from the NMCI Public Key Infrastructure.   The percentage 
applied is the rate at which users successfully obtain the certificate within the specified time 
period. 
Who: Vendor Frequency: Monthly report 
Where: Operations Center How measured:  The time  it takes for users to 
successfully    obtain    X.509    certificates    when 
attempted.    The    stipulated    target    time    (and 
percentage) to obtain certificates varies by level of 





Pre-Negotiation Contract SLA 
Level of Service (1) 5 minutes, 99.7% 2 minutes, 99.9% 5 min, 99.7% / 2 min, 99.9% 5 min, 99.7%/2 min, 99.9% 
Level of Service (2) 5 minutes, 99.7% 2 minutes, 99.9% 5 min, 99.7% / 2 min, 99.9% 5 min, 99.7% / 2 min, 99.9% 
Level of Service (3) 5 minutes, 99.7% 2 minutes, 99.9% 5 min, 99.7% / 2 min, 99.9% 5 min, 99.7% / 2 min, 99.9% 
Table 4-3. Performance Category 3: User registration for DOD Public Key 
Infrastructure within N/MCI. [After Ref. 2] 
Performance Measure Description: Measures the time from the submission of a user request 
to establishing fully functional DOD PKI X.509 certificates. The calculation is the number 
achieved divided by the number requested within a specified time 
Who: Vendor 
Where: DON-wide 
Level of Service (1) 
Level of Service (2) 
Level of Service (3) 
B Value 
(Unclassified) 
85% (1 week), 
100% (2 week) 
85% (1 week), 
100% (2 week) 
90% (3 days), 
100% (1 week) 
Frequency: Monthly report 
How measured: The time it takes from submission of 
a user request for a DOD PKI X.509 certificate to 
being fully functional using DOD PKI within NMCI 
B Value 
(Classified) 
85% (1 week), 
100% (2 week) 
85% (1 week), 
100% (2 week) 
90% (3 days), 
100% (1 week) 
Pre-Negotiation 
85% (1 wk), 100% (2 
wk)/85%(1 wk), 100% 
(2wk) 
85% (1 wk), 100% (2 
wk)/85%(1 wk),100% 
(2wk) 
90% (3 days), 100% (1 
wk) / 90% (3 days), 
100% (1 wk) 
Contract SLA 
85% (1 wk), 100% (2 
wk)/85%(1 wk), 100% 
(2wk) 
85% (1 wk), 100% (2 
wk)/85%(1 wk), 100% 
(2wk) 
90% (3 days), 100% (1 
wk) / 90% (3 days), 
100% (1 wk) 
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Table 4-4. Interoperability. [After Ref. 2] 
Performance Measure Description: This service requires full interoperability and seamless 
interface both within NMCI and to external and non-NMCI customers.  The purpose of this 
metric is to indicate the vendor's level of compliance in measurable terms. The vendor will 
develop an interoperability test plan and procedures that support this particular service. The 
test plan reporting criteria will include a threshold level, agreed to by Government and the 
vendor, that requires immediate notification of the Government and appropriate action by the 
vendor to correct. Implementation of the approved test plan is required as part of standard 
NMCI operational procedures.   Metrics indicated below reflect a standard criteria for the 
vendor to report to Government upon exceeding the threshold value agreed upon and stated 
in the interoperability test plan. 
Who: Vendor Frequency:       Measured       continuously, 
summarized  daily,   reported  monthly,  or 
when plan threshold value exceeded 
Where: Appropriate to this service (identified in 
test plan) 
How measured: Measured by Help Desk 
data or at points appropriate to this service 
category, as specifically identified in the 
NMCI interoperability test plan. 
B Value Pre-Negotiation Contract SLA 
Level of Service (1) within 1 day within 1 day 
Level of Service (2) within 1 day within 1 day 
Level of Service (3) within 4 hours within 4 hours 
3.        Analyzing the contact performance measures 
The criteria outlined in Section B of Chapter IH above is used to analyze the 
N/MCI contract performance measures. 
a. Certificate Revocation 
Description: The time it takes from when a certificate becomes 
compromised until it has been revoked. The N/MCI certificate revocation performance 
measure is analyzed below using the analytical concepts from Chapter HI. First the 
contract values are provided, then the scale from the analytical concepts in Chapter IH is 
used to determine if the measurements meet the standards. Finally, the data collected for 
this measure will be analyzed using the analytical concepts from Chapter m. 
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•   Meaningful: 
■ Contract Value: The contract requires that a certificate 
must be revoked within 1 hour (30 minutes for classified 
certificates). 
■ Probability of Mission Success: Comparing the contract 
value above to the scale in Table 3-1, a value of 0% is 
obtained. 
Note: This value and the following values are derived from 
scales developed in Chapter HI as illustrations and should not 
be considered as factual. 
o   Comparison: 
■ Commercial Vendors: The data from Section B2 of Chapter 
in indicates that commercial certificates are revoked within 
1 minute to 24 hours 
■ Probability of Mission Success: Comparing the 
commercial values above to the scale in Table 3-1, values 
of 100% to 0% are obtained. 
This data indicates that the revocation performance measure is not within 
commercial standards and will affect the performance of a command's mission. 
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Responsibility Related: 
o   Qualifications: 
Contract   Value:   The   contract   does   not   specify   the 
qualifications of the person performing this measure. 
Scale: Comparing the contract value above to the scale in 
Table 3-6, a value of 0 is obtained. 
o   Comparison: 
Commercial Vendors: The data from Section B2 of Chapter 
HI indicates that they do not require any qualifications for 
the person performing this measurement. 
Scale: Comparing the commercial value above to the scale 
in Table 3-6, a value of 0 is obtained. 
o   Incentive for data: 
Contract Value: The contract indicates that the contractor 
will receive monetary incentives for performance values 
within contract requirements. 
Scale: Comparing the contract value above to the scale in 
Table 3-7, a value of 100 is obtained. 
o    Comparison: 
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■ Commercial Vendors: The data from Section B2 of Chapter 
HI indicates that they do not have to provide any incentive 
for performing this measure. 
■ Scale: Comparing the commercial value above to the scale 
in Table 3-7, a value of 0 is obtained. 
o   Ability of person collecting data. 
■ Contract Value: The contract does not specify the ability of 
the person performing this measure. 
■ Scale: Comparing the contract value above to the scale in 
Table 3-8, a value of 0 is obtained. 
o   Comparison: 
■ Commercial Vendors: The data from Section B2 of 
Chapter HI indicates that they do not require any 
qualifications for the person performing this measure. 
■ Scale: Comparing the commercial value above to the scale 
in Table 3-8, a value of 0 is obtained. 
This data illustrates that the contract does not require a person who is 
qualified to perform the measurement. It also indicates that the contractor will receive 
incentive pay for producing data that is within the contract requirements. 
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•    Time Interval: 
■ Contract Value: The contract requires continuous 
monitoring and reporting of the revocation of certificates to 
the DON. 
■ Timeliness: Comparing the contract value above to the 
scale in Tables 3-9 and 3-10, values of 5 for monitoring and 
5 for reporting are obtained. 
o   Comparison: 
■ Commercial Vendors: The data from Section B2 of 
Chapter HI indicates that they do not monitor this criterion 
for the certificate revocation performance measure. 
■ Timeliness: Since vendors do not monitor this measure, no 
comparison can be made between the vendor's value and 
the scale established in Chapter m. 
This data illustrates that continuous monitoring is necessary for the 
revocation performance measure. This ensures that the contractor does not begin to 
deviate from the contract requirements. 
•    Credible: 
■ Contract Value: The contract does not require a confidence 
level interval for accuracy and reliability. 
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■ Accurate and Reliable: A comparison of the contract value 
above to the scale established in Chapter HI indicates that 
the data is not accurate or reliable. 
o   Comparison: 
■ Commercial Vendors: The data from Section B2 of 
Chapter HI indicates that they do not monitor this criterion 
for the certificate revocation performance measure. 
■ Accurate and Reliable: Since vendors do not monitor this 
measure, no comparison can be made between the vendor's 
value and the scale established in Chapter HI. 
The data collected from this performance measure is compared to the 
DON's random testing. If the contractor is reliable and accurate, the CRL will match the 
DON's revocation testing and will be within the timeframe required in the contract. 
•    Cost Effective: 
■ Contract Value: The contract only requires the contractor to 
monitor this performance measure one way with no 
alternatives. 
■ Cost-Effective: A comparison of the contract value above 
to the scale established in Chapter HI demonstrates that this 
measure is not cost effective because no alternatives were 
provided. 
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o   Comparison: 
■ Commercial Vendors: The data from Section B2 of 
Chapter HI indicates that they do not monitor this criterion 
for the certificate revocation performance measure. 
■ Cost-Effective: Since vendors do not monitor this measure, 
no comparison can be made between the vendor's value 
and the scale established in Chapter m. 
The contractor is contractually obligated to provide this data. The most 
efficient way of measuring this category is to have the contractor monitor themselves and 
be checked periodically by the DON. 
•    Comparable: 
o   Have the conditions changed?: 
■ Contract Value: The contract indicates that the contractor 
must provide monthly reports based on taking the same 
data the same way each time. 
■ Comparable: A comparison the contract value above to the 
scale established in Chapter HI demonstrates that the 
conditions for performing this measurement do not change. 
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o   Comparison: 
■ Commercial Vendors: The data from Section B2 of Chapter 
HI indicates that they do not monitor this criterion for the 
certificate revocation performance measure. 
■ Comparable: Since vendors do not monitor this measure, 
no comparison can be made between the vendor's value 
and the scale established in Chapter IE. 
o   Has the definition for the variable changed?: 
■ Contract Value: The contract requirements are outlined in 
the contract and should not change. 
■ Comparable: Comparing the contract value above to the 
scale established in Chapter m demonstrates that the 
definition for the variable in this measurement does not 
change. 
o   Comparison: 
■ Commercial Vendor: The data from Section B2 of Chapter 
HI indicates that they do not monitor this criteria for the 
certificate revocation performance measure. 
■ Comparable: Since vendors do not monitor- this measure, 
no comparison can be made between the vendor's value 
and the scale established in Chapter HI. 
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Since the contractor is responsible for keeping continuous records and 
providing monthly reports to the DON, a monthly analysis can be made to compare 
current revocation timeframes to past revocation timeframes. Unfortunately, initially, 
there is limited data available (either commercially or through government means) to use 
in evaluating this measure. This lack of data indicates that the DON will take longer to 
reach an effective revocation timeframe. However, this method also prevents the DON 
from reducing the revocation timeframe too much, and having to make further 
adjustments in the future. 
With the rapid advances in technology this author believes that there will 
be software available to monitor the certificate revocation process automatically, and the 
DON's random testing will ultimately be phased out. Obviously if any software is used it 
will have to be fully tested by the DON prior to its deployment.   This performance 
measure will become increasingly more important as the N/MCT contractor becomes fully 
deployed in the next two years, and the possibility of security breaches intensifies.  The 
recommendations section below discusses these concerns further and will compare this 
performance measure to the limited commercial performance measures that are available. 
b.        Ability of One N/MCI User to Obtain a Certificate of Another 
N/MCI User 
Description: Time required for users to successfully obtain, on the first 
attempt, the X.509 certificates from the N/MCI Public Key Infrastructure. [Ref. 2] The 
N/MCI performance measure to obtain a certificate is analyzed below using the analytical 
concepts from Chapter IE. First the contract values will be provided, then the scale from 
the analytical concepts in Chapter El will be used to determine if the measurements meet 
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the standards.   Finally, the data collected for this measure will be analyzed using the 
analytical concepts from Chapter HI. 
•    Meaningful: 
■ Contract Value: The contract indicates that the user 
certificates should be retrieved within 5 minutes (2 minutes 
for classified certificates). 
■ Probability of Mission Success: Comparing the contract 
value above to the illustrative scale in Table 3-2, a value of 
100% is obtained. 
o   Comparison: 
■ Commercial Vendors: The data from Section B2 of Chapter 
HI indicates that user certificates are retrieved within 5 
seconds to 5 minutes. 
■ Probability of Mission Success: Comparing the commercial 
values above to the illustrative scale in Table 3-2, values of 
100% and 100% are obtained. 
This data illustrates that this performance measure is within commercial 
standards and a command's mission performance should be successful. 
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•    Responsibility Related: 
o   Qualifications: 
■ Contract Value: The contract does not specify the 
qualifications of the person performing this measure. 
■ Scale: Comparing the contract value above to the 
illustrative scale in Table 3-6, a value of 0 is obtained. 
o   Comparison: 
■ Commercial Vendors: The data from Section B2 of Chapter 
HI indicates that they do not require any qualifications for 
the person performing this measure. 
■ Scale: Comparing the commercial value above to the 
illustrative scale in Table 3-6, a value of 0 is obtained. 
o   Incentive for data: 
■ Contract Value: The contract indicates that the contractor 
will receive monetary incentives for performance values 
within contract requirements. 
■ Scale: Comparing the contract value above to the 
illustrative scale in Table 3-7, a value of 100 is obtained. 
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o    Comparison: 
■ Commercial Vendors: The data from Section B2 of Chapter 
in indicates that they do not have to provide any incentive 
for performing this measure. 
■ Scale: Comparing the commercial value above to the 
illustrative scale in Table 3-7, a value of 0 is obtained. 
o   Ability of person collecting data. 
■ Contract Value: The contract does not specify the ability of 
the person performing this measure 
■ Scale: Comparing the contract value above to the 
illustrative scale in Table 3-8, a value of 0 is obtained. 
o   Comparison: 
■ Commercial Vendors: The data from Section B2 of Chapter 
HI indicates that they do not require any qualifications for 
the person performing this measure. 
■ Scale: Comparing the commercial value above to the scale 
in Table 3-8, a value of 0 is obtained. 
This data illustrates that the contract does not require a person who is 
qualified to perform the measurement. It also indicates that the contractor will receive 
incentive pay for producing measurements that are within the contract requirements. 
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•    Time Interval: 
■ Contract Value: The contract indicates that the contractor 
must continuously collect the data for this performance 
measure, but only reports it monthly. 
■ Timeliness: Comparing the contract value above to the 
illustrative scale in Tables 3-9 and 3-10, values of 5 for 
monitoring and 2 for reporting are obtained. 
o   Comparison: 
■ Commercial Vendors: The data from Section B2 of 
Chapter 3 indicates that they do not monitor this criteria for 
the user certificate retrieval performance measure. 
■ Timeliness: Since vendors do not monitor this measure, no 
comparison can be made between the vendor's value and 
the scale established in Chapter HI. 
The DON has no intention of verifying that the contractor is performing 
this measure. Therefore, the DON will have to trust the contractor's results. Since the 
DON has no past contractual relationship with EDS this trust will take several months to 
develop. Monthly reports should provide sufficient coverage for this performance 
measure. This should ensure the contractor's systems are operating efficiently. 
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•    Credible: 
■ Contract Value: The contract does not require a confidence 
level interval for accuracy and reliability. 
■ Accurate and Reliable: A comparison of the contract value 
above to the illustrative scale established in Chapter m 
indicates that the data is not accurate or reliable. 
o   Comparison: 
■ Commercial Vendors: The data from Section B2 of 
Chapter in indicates that they do not monitor this against 
the standard for the user certificate retrieval performance 
measure. 
■ Accurate and Reliable: Since vendors do not monitor this 
measure, no comparison can be made between the vendor's 
value and the scale illustrative established in Chapter EL 
The government has no plans to conduct any additional testing to verify 
the contractor's results. [Ref. 2] The DON will rely on the contractor's results and 
possibly customer feedback data for this performance measure. Therefore, with the 
current requirements, it is difficult to determine if the contractor is reliable and accurate. 
48 
•    Cost Effective: 
■ Contract Value: The contract requires the contractor to 
manually monitor this performance measure and does not 
provide any alternatives. 
■ Cost-Effective: A comparison the contract value above to 
the illustrative scale established in Chapter m demonstrates 
that this measure is not cost effective because no 
alternatives were provided. 
o   Comparison: 
■ Commercial Vendors: The data from Section B2 of 
Chapter HI indicates that they do not monitor this criterion 
for the user certificate retrieval performance measure. 
■ Cost-Effective: Since vendors do not monitor this measure, 
no comparison can be made between the vendor's value 
and the illustrative scale established in Chapter HI. 
Based on the fact that the contractor is contractually obligated to provide 
this data, it is the author's opinion that the most efficient way of measuring this category 
is to have the contractor monitor themselves and be periodically checked by the DON. 
The DON should not invest in the resources to monitor this performance measure unless 
an inordinate amount of unsatisfactory customer complaints concerning this performance 
measure are received. 
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Comparable: 
o   Have the conditions changed?: 
■ Contract Value: The contract requires the contractor to 
provide monthly reports based on taking the same data the 
same way each time. 
■ Comparable: A comparison the contract value above to the 
illustrative scale established in Chapter III demonstrates 
that the conditions for performing this measurement do not 
change. 
o   Comparison: 
■ Commercial Vendors:The data from Section B2 of Chapter 
HI indicates that they do not monitor this criteria for the 
certificate revocation performance measure. 
■ Comparable: Since vendors do not monitor this measure no 
comparison can be made between the vendor's value and 
the illustrative scale established in Chapter EL 
o   Has the definition for the variable changed?: 
■ Contract Value: The contract requirements are outlined in 
the contract and should not change. 
■ Comparable: A comparison of the contract value above to 
the illustrative scale established in Chapter m demonstrates 
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that the definition for the variable in this measurement does 
not change. 
o   Comparison: 
■ Commercial Vendors: The data from Section B2 of Chapter 
HI indicates that they do not monitor this criteria for the 
certificate revocation performance measure. 
■ Comparable: Since vendors do not monitor this measure no 
comparison can be made between the vendor's value and 
the illustrative scale established in Chapter HI. 
Since the contractor is responsible for keeping continuous records and 
providing monthly reports to the DON, an analysis can be made using these reports. 
Unfortunately, initially, there is limited data available (either commercially or through 
government means) to use in evaluating this measure. This lack of data indicates that the 
DON will take longer to reach an effective timeframe for this measure. However, this 
method also prevents the DON from reducing the measure timeframe too much, and 
having to make further adjustments in the future. 
This performance measure is a customer satisfaction issue as well as a 
security issue (the delay in getting a certificate could cause a delay in sending an 
encrypted message). The recommendations section below discusses this concern further. 
c. Timeliness of User Registration for a DOD Certificate 
Description: It measures the time from the submission of a user's request 
until a fully functional DOD PKI X.509 certificate is received by the user. [Ref. 2] The 
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N/MCI performance measure to obtain a certificate is analyzed below using the analytical 
concepts from Chapter IE. First the contract values will be provided, then the scale from 
the analytical concepts in Chapter m will be used to determine if the measurements meet 
the standard. Finally, the data collected for this measure will be analyzed using the 
analytical concepts from Chapter HI. 
Meaningful: 
Contract Value: The contract requires that certificates 
should be created within 2 weeks (1 week for service level 
3). 
Probability of Mission Success: Comparing the contract 
value above to the scale in Table 3-3, a value of 0% is 
obtained. 
o   Comparison: 
■ Commercial Vendors: The data from Section B2 of Chapter 
HI indicates that certificates are created within 5 minutes to 
14 days. 
■ Probability of Mission Success: Comparing the commercial 
values above to the illustrative scale in Table 3-3, values of 
100% to 0% are obtained. 
This   data  illustrates  that  this   performance   measure  is   not  within 
commercial standards, and a command's mission performance may not be successful. 
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With the amount of DON members reporting to new commands everyday, this 
performance measure is critical to allowing a command to complete its mission in a 
timely manner. A member should be able to report to a new command and start 
operating almost immediately. Service levels one and two allow the contractor two 
weeks to register a new user. This amount of time seems excessive and may hinder a 
command's mission performance. Similarly, the one week for service level three could 
impact the mission performance as well. 
•    Responsibility Related: 
o   Qualifications: 
■ Contract Value: The contract does not specify the 
qualifications of the person performing this measure. 
■ Scale: Comparing the contract value above to the 
illustrative scale in Table 3-6, a value of 0 is obtained. 
o   Comparison: 
■ Commercial Vendors: The data from Section B2 of Chapter 
3 indicates that they do not require any qualifications for 
the person performing this measure. 
■ Scale: Comparing the commercial value above to the 
illustrative scale in Table 3-6, a value of 0 is obtained. 
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o   Incentive for data: 
■ Contract Value: The contractor will receive monetary 
incentives for performance values within contract 
requirements. 
■ Scale: Comparing the contract value above to the 
illustrative scale in Table 3-7, a value of 100 is obtained. 
o    Comparison: 
■ Commercial Vendors: The data from Section B2 of Chapter 
HI indicates that they do not have to provide any incentive 
for performing this measure. 
■ Scale: Comparing the commercial value above to the 
illustrative scale in Table 3-7, a value of 0 is obtained. 
o   Ability of person-collecting data. 
■ Contract Value: The contract does not specify the ability of 
the person performing this measure 
■ Scale: Comparing the contract value above to the 
illustrative scale in Table 3-8, a value of 0 is obtained. 
o   Comparison: 
■ Commercial Vendors: The data from Section B2 of Chapter 
III indicates that they do not require any qualifications for 
the person performing this measure. 
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■    Scale:  Comparing the commercial value above to the 
illustrative scale in Table 3-8, a value of 0 is obtained. 
This data illustrates that the contract does not require a person who is 
qualified to perform the measurement. It also indicates that the contractor will receive 
incentive pay for producing data that is within the contract requirements. 
•    Time Interval: 
■ Contract Value: The contract indicates that the contractor 
must continuously collect the data for this performance 
measure, but only report, it monthly. 
■ Timeliness: Comparing the contract value above to the 
illustrative scale in Tables 3-9 and 3-10, values of 5 for 
monitoring and 2 for reporting are obtained. 
o   Comparison: 
■ Commercial Vendors: The data from Section B2 of 
Chapter IE indicates that they do not monitor this criteria 
for the certificate creation performance measure. 
■ Timeliness: Comparing the vendor's value above to the 
illustrative scale in Tables 3-9 and 3-10, values of 0 for 
monitoring and 0 for reporting are obtained. 
The DON has no intention of verifying that the contractor is performing 
this measure.  Therefore, the DON will have to trust the contractor's results.  Since the 
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DON has no past contractual relationship with EDS this trust will take several months to 
develop. Monthly reports should provide sufficient coverage for this performance 
measure. This should ensure the contractor's systems are operating efficiently. 
•    Credible: 
■ Contract Value: The contract does not require a confidence 
level interval for accuracy and reliability. 
■ Accurate and Reliable: A comparison of the contract value 
above to the illustrative scale established in Chapter IE 
indicates that the data is not accurate or reliable. 
o   Comparison: 
■ Commercial Vendors: The data from Section B2 of 
Chapter m indicates that they do not monitor this against 
the standard for the certificate creation performance 
measure. 
■ Accurate & Reliable: Since vendors do not monitor this 
measure, no comparison can be made between the vendor's 
value and the illustrative scale established in Chapter HI. 
The DON has no plans to conduct any additional testing to verify the 
contractor's results. The DON will rely on the contractor's results and possibly customer 
feedback data for this performance measure. Therefore, with the current requirements, it 
is difficult to determine if the contractor is reliable and accurate. 
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•    Cost Effective: 
■ Contract Value: The contract requires the contractor to 
manually monitor this performance measure one way with 
no alternatives. 
■ Cost-Effective: A comparison the contract value above to 
the illustrative scale established in Chapter IE demonstrates 
that this measure is not cost effective because no 
alternatives were provided. 
o   Comparison: 
■ Commercial Vendors: The data from Section B2 of 
Chapter m indicates that they do not monitor this criterion 
for the certificate creation performance measure. 
■ Cost-Effective: Since vendors do not monitor this measure, 
no comparison can be made between the vendor's value 
and the illustrative scale established in Chapter Id. 
Based on the fact that the contractor is contractually obligated to provide 
this data, it is the author's opinion that the most efficient way of measuring this category 
is to have the contractor monitor themselves and be periodically checked by the DON. 
The DON should not invest in the resources to monitor this performance measure unless 
an inordinate amount of unsatisfactory customer complaints concerning this performance 
measure are received. 
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Comparable: 
o   Have the conditions changed?: 
■ Contract Value: The contract indicates that the contractor 
must provide monthly reports based on taking the same 
data the same way each time. 
■ Comparable: A comparison of the contract value above to 
the illustrative scale established in Chapter m demonstrates 
that the conditions for performing this measurement do not 
change. 
o   Comparison: 
■ Commercial Vendors: The data from Section B2 of Chapter 
HI indicates that they do not monitor this against the 
standard for the certificate revocation performance 
measure. 
■ Comparable: Since vendors do not monitor this measure no 
comparison can be made between the vendor's value and 
the illustrative scale established in Chapter IE. 
o   Has the definition for the variable changed?: 
■ Contract Value: The contract requirements are outlined in 
the contract and should not change. 
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■ Comparable: A comparison of the contract value above to 
the illustrative scale established in Chapter HI demonstrates 
that the definition for the variable in this measurement does 
not change. 
o   Comparison: 
■ Commercial Vendors: The data from Section B2 of Chapter 
HI indicates that they do not monitor this criterion for the 
certificate revocation performance measure. 
■ Comparable: Since vendors do not monitor this measure no 
comparison can be made between the vendor's value and 
the illustrative scale established in Chapter HI. 
Since the contractor is responsible for keeping continuous records and 
providing monthly reports to the DON, an analysis can be made using these reports. 
Unfortunately, initially, there is limited data available (either commercially or through 
government means) to use in evaluating this measure. This lack of data indicates that the 
DON will take longer to reach an effective timeframe for this measure. However, this 
method also prevents the DON from reducing the measure timeframe too much, and 
having to make further adjustments in the future. 
This performance measure is more of a customer satisfaction issue rather 
than any type of security issue, especially with the need for transferring service members 
in a timely manner. The recommendations section below discusses this concern further. 
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d.        Interoperability 
Description: It measures the degree of interoperability and the level of 
seamless interface both internally within the N/MCI and externally, among non-N/MCI 
commands. [Ref. 2] As of the writing of this thesis, the contractor has not developed an 
interoperability test plan or the procedures that support this particular service, as required 
in the N/MCI contract. The N/MCI interoperability performance measure is analyzed 
below using the analytical concepts from Chapter HI. First the contract values will be 
provided, then the scale from the analytical concepts in Chapter III will be used to 
determine if the measurements meets the standard. Finally, the data collected for this 
measure will be analyzed using the characteristics from Chapter m. 
•    Meaningful: 
o   Interoperability between networks: 
■ Contract Value: The contract does not specify a 
requirement based on the type of network with which the 
interoperability problems occur. 
■ Probability of Mission Success: Comparing the contract 
value above to the illustrative scale in Table 3-4, a value 
cannot be obtained. 
o   Comparison: 
■ Commercial Vendors: The data from Section B2 of Chapter 
m indicates that they do not monitor this criterion for the 
interoperability performance measure. 
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■ Probability of Mission Success: Comparing the vendor's 
value above to the illustrative scale in Table 3-4, a value 
cannot be obtained. 
o   System down-time due to interoperability: 
■ Contract Value: The contract indicates that interoperability 
issues should be corrected within one day (4 hours for 
service level 3). 
■ Probability of Mission Success: Comparing the contract 
value above to the illustrative scale in Table 3-5, a value of 
75% is obtained. 
o   Comparison: 
■ Commercial Vendors: The data from Section B2 of Chapter 
IE indicates that they do not monitor this criteria for the 
interoperability performance measure. 
■ Probability of Mission Success: Comparing the vendor's 
value above to the illustrative scale in Table 3-5, a value 
cannot be obtained. 
This data indicates this measure is relevant to the DON's mission and their 
goal of eliminating interoperability problems between commands within the DON. This 
performance measure will also provide data on possible problems the DON may 
encounter when trying to communicate securely with other government agencies. 
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Responsibility Related: 
o   Qualifications: 
Contract  Value:     The  contract  does  not  specify  the 
qualifications of the person performing this measure. 
Scale:   Comparing   the   contract   value   above   to   the 
illustrative scale in Table 3-6, a value of 0 is obtained. 
o   Comparison: 
Commercial Vendors: The data from Section B2 of Chapter 
IE indicates that they do not require any qualifications for 
the person performing this measure. 
Scale: Comparing the commercial value above to the 
illustrative scale in Table 3-6, a value of 0 is obtained. 
o   Incentive for data: 
Contract Value: The contract indicates that the contractor 
will receive monetary incentives for performance values 
within contract requirements. 
Scale: Comparing the contract value above to the 
illustrative scale in Table 3-7, a value of 100 is obtained. 
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o    Comparison: 
■ Commercial Vendors: The data from Section B2 of Chapter 
DI indicates that they do not have to provide any incentive 
for performing this measure. 
■ Scale: Comparing the commercial value above to the 
illustrative scale in Table 3-7, a value of 0 is obtained. 
o   Ability of person collecting data. 
■ Contract Value: The contract does not specify the ability of 
the person performing this measure 
■ Scale: Comparing the contract value above to the 
illustrative scale in Table 3-8, a value of 0 is obtained. 
o   Comparison: 
■ Commercial Vendors: The data from Section B2 of Chapter 
HI indicates that they do not require any qualifications for 
the person performing this measure. 
o   Scale: Comparing the commercial value above to the illustrative 
scale in Table 3-8, a value of 0 is obtained. 
This data indicates that the contract does not require a person who is 
qualified to perform the measurement. It also indicates that the contractor will receive 
incentive pay for producing data that is within the contract requirements. 
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•   Time Interval: 
■ Contract Value: The contract indicates that the contractor 
must continuously collect the data for this performance 
measure, but only report it monthly. 
■ Timeliness: Comparing the contract value above to the 
illustrative scale in Tables 3-9 and 3-10, values of 5 for 
monitoring and 2 for reporting are obtained. 
o   Comparison: 
■ Commercial Vendors: The data from Section B2 of 
Chapter HI indicates that they do not monitor this criterion 
for the interoperability performance measure. 
■ Timeliness: Comparing the vendor's value above to the 
illustrative scale in Tables 3-9 and 3-10, values of 0 for 
monitoring and 0 for reporting are obtained. 
The DON has no intention of verifying that the contractor is performing 
this measure. [Ref. 28] Therefore, the DON will have to trust the contractor's results. 
Since the DON has no past contractual relationship with EDS this trust will take several 
months to develop. The reports should provide sufficient coverage for this performance 
measure. This should ensure the contractor's systems are operating efficiently. 
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•     Credible: 
■ Contract Value: The contract does not require a confidence 
level interval for accuracy and reliability. 
■ Accurate and Reliable: A comparison of the contract value 
above to the illustrative scale established in Chapter HI 
indicates that the data is not accurate or reliable. 
o   Comparison: 
■ Commercial Vendors: The data from Section B2 of 
Chapter IE indicates that they do not monitor this against 
the standard for the interoperability performance measure. 
■ Accurate and Reliable: Since vendors do not monitor this 
measure, no comparison can be made between the vendor's 
value and the illustrative scale established in Chapter HI. 
The DON has no plans to conduct any additional testing to verify the 
contractor's results. The DON will rely on the contractor's results and possibly customer 
feedback data for this performance measure. [Ref. 2] Therefore, with the current contract 
requirements, the only way the DON will determine if the contractor is reliable and 
accurate is through customer complaints. 
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•    Cost Effective: 
■ Contract Value: The contract requires the contractor to 
manually monitor this performance measure one way with 
no alternatives. 
■ Cost-Effective: A comparison of the contract value above 
to the illustrative scale established in Chapter m 
demonstrates that this measure is not cost effective because 
no alternatives were provided. 
o   Comparison: 
■ Commercial Vendors: The data from Section B2 of 
Chapter HI indicates that they do not monitor this criterion 
for the interoperability performance measure. 
■ Cost-Effective: Since vendors do not monitor this measure, 
no comparison can be made between the vendor's value 
and the illustrative scale established in Chapter HI. 
Based on the fact that the contractor is contractually obligated to provide 
this data, it is the author's opinion that the most efficient way of measuring this category 
is to have the contractor monitor themselves and be periodically checked by the DON. 
The DON should not invest in the resources to monitor this performance measure unless 
an inordinate amount of unsatisfactory customer complaints concerning this performance 
measure are received. 
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Comparable: 
o   Have the conditions changed?: 
■ Contract Value: The contract requires the contractor to 
provide monthly reports so the DON can compare them for 
trends in the contractor's performance. 
■ Comparable: A comparison the contract value above to the 
illustrative scale established in Chapter HI demonstrates 
that the conditions for performing this measurement do not 
change. 
o   Comparison: 
■ Commercial Vendors: The data from Section B2 of Chapter 
EH indicates that they do not monitor this criterion for the 
interoperability performance measure. 
■ Comparable: Since vendors do not monitor this measure, 
no comparison can be made between the vendor's value 
and the illustrative scale established in Chapter HI. 
o   Has the definition for the variable changed?: 
■ Contract Value: The contract requirements are outlined in 
the contract and should not change. 
■ Comparable: A comparison the contract value above to the 
illustrative scale established in Chapter HI demonstrates 
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that the definition for the variable in this measurement does 
not change. 
o   Comparison: 
■ Commercial Vendor: The data from Section B2 of Chapter 
DI indicates that they do not monitor this criteria for the 
certificate revocation performance measure. 
■ Comparable: Since vendors do not monitor this measure no 
comparison can be made between the vendor's value and 
the illustrative scale established in Chapter m. 
Since the contractor is responsible for keeping continuous records and 
providing monthly reports to the DON, an analysis can be made using these reports. 
Unfortunately, initially, there is limited data available (either commercially or through 
government means) to use in evaluating this measure. This lack of data indicates that the 
DON will take longer to reach an effective timeframe for this measure. However, this 
method also prevents the DON from reducing the measure timeframe too much, and 
having to make further adjustments in the future. 
This performance measure is a customer satisfaction issue as well as a 
security issue, (if important data is not available, it can be a security issue) especially 
with the timeliness of correcting interoperability issues. The recommendations section 
below discusses this interoperability issue further. 
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4.        N/MCI Performance Measures Recommendations 
a. Certificate Revocation 
The   contractor   must   follow   the   Department   of   Defense's   PKI 
specifications as specified in the contract requirements. [Ref. 2] Currently, the contract 
requirements specify CRLs, but an alternative method for invalidating certificates (the 
on-line certificate verification process) is becoming popular. The problems associated 
with revocation are a rather new area of research, and on-line validation is even newer. 
On-line verification is being promoted as the more reliable and quicker answer to the 
revocation problem, however, this type of technology has never been proven on such a 
large scale enterprise as the DON. [Ref. 14] One advantage of on-line verification, over 
CRLs is the speed of retrieving up-to-date verification. The disadvantage of both on-lin 
verification and CRLs is the dependency on the network traffic. [Ref. 37] 
The contract only specifies a requirement for the contractor to provide the 
certificate authority with the revocation notification. It does not indicate the timeliness of 
transmitting CRLs. It is recommended that the contractor adhere to one of the pilot 
program's standard of sending out or downloading a new CRL every four hours, and 
sending out a Delta-CRL every ten minutes. [Ref. 35] 
When comparing the commercial performance measures for certificate 
revocation with the N/MCI contract performance measures, this thesis will assume that 
the authors of the N/MCI contract intended that the time restrictions include the 
distribution of the CRLs. 
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By comparing the certificate revocation time advertised by commercial 
PKI businesses to the time indicated in the N/MCI contract, it is clear that the contract 
requirement specifies an adequate time for DOD Class 3 PKI certificate revocation. 
Since CRLs have been proven to be a secure and trustworthily form of 
certificate revocation, it is recommended that the N/MCI contractor continue using CRLs 
until DISA/NSA determine that the DOD Class 3 PKI can support on-line verification. 
[Ref. 19] Once on-line verification is fully established for DOD, it is recommended the 
N/MCI contractor switch their process to this scheme, and the N/MCI performance 
measure be reduced to reflect commercial performance measures. Based on the research 
done in this thesis, this change would reduce the performance measure down to a 
maximum of two minutes for a revocation to take place. [Ref. 14] Prior to changing over 
to on-line verification the government can use data collected by the green team to adjust 
the PKI revocation contract requirements as necessary. 
Due to the extreme importance of having certificate-based trust within the 
N/MCI, this area of the contract must be strictly monitored for compliance.   Without 
complete and timely management of. revocations, the entire Department of the Navy 
would have less trust of the certificates they encounter on a day-to-day basis. 
b.        Ability of One NMCI User to Obtain a Certificate of Another 
NMCI User 
The performance measure for this category in the N/MCI contract is 
aligned with the commercial industry. Receiving a user's public key within the contract 
specification of five minutes should be adequate considering the number of DON users. 
However, with the advancement in PKI technology, it is possilbe that this value will be 
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decreased in the future. By that time, the N/MCI contractor should have in place an 
extensive network of key directories that will provide a user's public key almost 
instantaneously. 
There is concern about how the contractor is going to collect this data on 
obtaining certificates and prove to the government that it is correct and accurate data. 
The contractor's incentive pay is based on these findings, so it is recommended that there 
be some form of government monitoring of this performance measure. It is 
recommended that monitoring be completed at random intervals and at random 
commands, where actual timing is done on the acquiring of a user's public key. At the 
very least, this should be a section included in the customer satisfaction form, so that 
users can provide feedback on their experiences. 
c.        Timeliness of User Registration for a DOD Public Key 
The contract required time frame for certificate creation, which is one 
week for 85 percent of the certificates, and two weeks for 100 percent of the certificates, 
is extremely high when compared to the commercial industry. The contractual values 
were developed over two years ago when PKI was fairly new in the DOD and there was 
no data available on the length of time required for certificate creation within a large PKI. 
[Ref. 27] Today's commercial PKI businesses proclaim timelines in a scale of minutes, 
which is much less than or much faster than the N/MCI performance measure value. It is 
understandable that the DON has to go through a more rigorous application interview. 
However, if commands are to maintain a high level of mission readiness it is 
recommended that this performance measure be reduced to one day. 
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The current N/MCI performance measure could lead to a possible loss of 
productivity. This loss is most prevalent when a service member transfers to a new 
command and may have to wait two weeks until they can log onto a computer and be 
productive. Service members who are temporarily assigned to other commands could 
also have problems communicating securely within a reasonable timeframe. Finally, 
service members work seven days a week, and the contract does not specifically require 
providing certificates on the weekend. It is recommended that this be clarified so this 
issue does not become a problem in the future. 
These N/MCI performance measures were developed with the shear size 
of the DON in mind and consideration for how the N/MCI contractor would process all 
of these members. However, the contractor is being phased in, and the issuance of these 
certificates is being phased in as well. Also, it is likely that the contractor will have more 
than one issuing agency throughout the DON. Even with these issues, the above 
recommendation to reduce the time it takes to create a certificate is still valid. 
The government is not monitoring this performance measure and will rely 
almost entirely on the data that the contractor supplies. Since the contractor receives 
incentive pay to maintain this performance measure, it is recommended that random 
checks at various CA/RA/LRAs be completed on a monthly basis to ensure that the 
contractor is, at the very least, meeting the contract requirements. These random checks 
will provide the DON sufficient data to ensure the level of service does not degrade over 
the five year contract length. Due to the possibility that a vast amount of productivity 
could be lost to the registration process, the author believes that this will be the number 
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one customer satisfaction issue. It is recommended that this be part of the customer 
satisfaction form, at the very least. 
d.        Interoperability 
The public key infrastructure outlined in the Navy Marine Corps Intranet 
contract is not the first government PKI program. The government has established 
several PKI pilot programs in different agencies throughout the DOD. The government 
has recognized the need to have these PKIs be interoperable. With that in consideration, 
the Federal PKI (FPKI) agency has been working with Entrust Technologies to develop 
the Federal Bridge Certification Authority (FBCA). The FBCA and FPKI CAs are 
networked together and linked to the Canadian Federal Government's Entrust PKI to 
create a trusted test environment for the validation of digital certificates and exchange of 
secure information between the participants. [Ref. 18] See Figure 4-1 The FBCA acts as 
a trusted third party to ensure that, when a user needs to accept a PKI certificate from 









Figure 3-1. FBCA. [From Ref. 18] 
The DON interoperates with a large number of other public key 
infrastructures including Allies, commercial contractors and other DOD agencies. Since 
the DOD PKI is based primarily on using commercial standards, it will allow 
interoperability with most US entities and the DON. However, this may not be 
acceptable if the DON has to interoperate with non-US entities (e.g., Allies and Coalition 
partners). [Ref. 19] Therefore, the author recommends that the N/MCI contractor 
become a member in the FBCA so that the above possible interoperability issues can be 
eliminated. 
One interoperability issue that has not been discussed is the requirement 
that all DOD PKIs use the Netscape Communicator 4.7 browser. This browser was 
selected by the DOD as the standard certificate based application for DOD certificates. 
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However, the N/MCI contract requires the contractor to supply each computer station 
with Microsoft's Internet Explorer browser. This interoperability issue will need to be 
resolved. One resolution is to install Netscape on each N/MCI computer. 
5.        Cost Analysis of the Recommended Changes 
A complete cost analysis on any recommended changes is beyond the scope of 
this thesis. However, a brief look at possible contract increases for each of the 
recommend changes follows. Note: This is by no means a conclusive analysis. 
a. Certificate Revocation 
After  the   government   validates   the   process   of  on-line   certificate 
revocation and the contract is modified to reflect this technology, the changes should not 
result in an increase in the government's costs. The contract requires the contractor to 
adapt their current technology to industry changes. [Ref. 2] On-line verification is a 
technology that could be well established in the commercial industry by the time the 
government decides to implement it, so the measurements should be modified to reflect 
industry standards without penalty to the DON. 
b. Ability of One NMCI User to Obtain a Certificate of Another 
NMCI User 
The random government monitoring of this measure could be done at a 
very minimal cost. This random test could be done by the SPAWAR's green team at the 
same time they test the certificate revocation. The agency responsible for monitoring 
customer service could also add a response time question on surveys to gather the data. 
Finally, with today's technology, this process could be remotely monitored by a computer 
application that issues monthly reports to the N/MCI contracting officer. This cost would 
only be for initial application setup and some monitoring. 
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c. Timeliness of User Registration for a DOD Public Key 
Reducing the timeline of registration to one day for 85% completion and 
two days for 100% completion should not be a cost to the government. The contract was 
written when PKI's were first starting to become a viable e-commerce security program, 
and the contractual time frame was adequate at that time. However, PKI technology has 
developed tremendously, and the above recommendation should be the contractual 
standard. If there are any costs incurred for this change, the government is sure to recoup 
these costs through the decrease in production losses. 
Monitoring of this performance measure could involve some substantial 
costs if it were to be physically monitored by someone. However, this is a measure that 
can be monitored through customer satisfaction surveys and would not be any additional 
cost to the government. 
d. Interoperability 
Decreasing the time of having one system interoperate with another 
system down to four hours for all service levels will probably add costs to the N/MCI 
contract. The contractor could incur additional costs trying to maintain that level of 
service. However, this is only a temporary situation that should only last at most the first 
two years. 
It is the author's opinion that the public key infrastructure portion of the 
contract have strong measures at whatever cost to the government, to insure that possible 
espionage does not occur. Any penetration into our defense systems could cost the 
government loss of infrastructure and possibly the cost of human life. 
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C.       TRANSITION TO N/MCI 
1. Past Beliefs 
As stated in Appendix A, throughout history, governments have sent messages 
securely between commands using one-key encryption. This method has worked 
efficiently for years, and because a majority of this was accomplished by only a select 
few, most service members never dealt with possible security issues. Unfortunately, 
technology has forced security requirements down upon the entire fleet. 
This new technology impact is not only felt in security issues. With the 
implementation of the N/MCI contract, the DON will have to change the way it procures 
and manages information technology. Commands that previously were responsible for 
ensuring that their technology was as current as the rest of the fleet will no longer be 
responsible for this. The N/MCI contractor will have the responsibility of keeping 
commands' information technology current. Unfortunately, all the commands' IT 
concerns are not erased with the implementation of the N/MCI. With this contract come 
new problems and issues that are discussed in the next section. 
2. Future Concerns 
The current way the DON operates is in state of major reconstruction. 
Technology has driven our old methods of conducting business out the door and service 
members are going to have to adapt to this new technology. Public key infrastructure 
will demand that our systems become more secure. This means that just logging on to 
our system will take extra effort. The government has mandated that every DON 
member be issued a Class 3 level (Medium Assurance) certificate by the end of October 
77 
2001. To support this, Smart Cards will be issued. These will not only be a service 
member's personnel identification card, but will also be required to access DON systems 
by inserting it in a Smart Card reader. 
The majority of the service members should have no problem adapting to this new 
way of accessing their systems. It is likely that the problems with these technology 
changes revolve mainly around senior civilian employees (currently 50 percent of 
government employees are within two years of retirement). [Ref. 7] Some of these 
individuals might require a longer learning curve to adapt to this technology, and some 
may protest against these changes. 
Parallel with these security changes, the DON is going through other changes 
with the new N/MCI. Commands will have to adapt to letting others decide which 
hardware, software, and infrastructure they should have. Senior commanders may have a 
hard time giving up this control, while others may invite these changes so that they do not 
have to deal with the decisions. One impact that can be foreseen is a command 
demanding more computers than what is outlined in the N/MCI contract. This issue is 
likely to be based on a difference of opinion, and the deciding vote will probably be the 
N/MCI contracting officer. 
Another future concern is that commands may operate separate computers that are 
not controlled under the N/MCI contract. This would allow the command to run software 
that the N/MCI contractor may not provide. These non-standard computers could cause 
interoperability problems and decrease production - the very problems that the N/MCI 
was implemented to correct.   This could also create double the work for command 
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administrative personnel and create possible inconsistencies between commands. Also, 
funding for N/MCI is given to commands so that information technology costs can be 
tracked for each command. If commands spend funds allotted for other programs on 
non-N/MCI technology, it will contribute to an inaccurate accounting of how much the 
DON is actually spending on information technology. 
Obviously there are several issues that will surface during this tremendous 
transformation. Hopefully, the government is analyzing the problems that occur as the 
N/MCI is implemented. Additionally, the DON needs to communicate these issues with 
the entire fleet prior to full implementation, so that commands can be proactive regarding 
the problems, vice reactive. 
D.       PERFORMANCE MEASURE CONTROLS 
As discussed in the above sections the government is giving the N/MCI contractor 
considerable leeway in the monitoring of the PKI performance measures. Specifically, 
certificate revocation is the only PKI performance measure that is being monitored by the 
DON in an attempt to verify that the N/MCI contractor is performing correctly. The 
DON is paying the contractor an incentive fee for all the PKI performance measures 
where they provide satisfactory service. Unfortunately, the DON is basing their 
satisfactory service on the reports provided by the N/MCI contractor. [Ref. 2] The above 
issues are further discussed in the sections below. 
1.        Green Team Monitoring 
The only performance measure that the government is required to verify is the 
timely revocation of a certificate.  The other three performance measures are conducted 
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by the N/MCI contractor and they submit unverified monthly reports. A green team has 
been established at the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) to 
conduct tests necessary to judge compliance of the certificate revocation performance 
measure. [Ref. 28] Unlike red teams, who conduct unannounced vulnerability testing 
using cutting edge hacker technology, green teams are designed for the purpose of 
verifying the compliance of a specific area, and they make their presence fully known to 
the contractor. [Ref. 28] 
2. Performance Incentives 
The N/MCI contract was awarded to Electronic Data Systems Corporation (EDS) 
of Piano, Texas for $6,938,817,954. There is a guaranteed five year basic period plus the 
three year option period. [Ref. 26] EDS has the opportunity to increase this amount by 
meeting certain performance incentives, outlined in the contract. The major incentive is 
through seat service performance, which can range from $25 to $100 per quarter, per 
seat, depending on the rating of their service. Incentives will also be given for 
information assurance, small business participation, and achievement of full operational 
capability. For the fiscal year 2001, the incentives could add up to $38.8 million. [Ref. 
16] 
3. Control of Revocation Incentives 
If the DON concludes that the contractor is not adhering to the contract 
requirements for the revocation of certificates, the DON may have to modify the contract 
to increase inspections and hold back incentive pay. This category is far-too important to 
national security to allow for any slippage in the revocation time.   If the revocation 
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processes were to fail, the costs could be far greater than money, as in, loss of life, or 
threat to the national security. 
Finally, the contractor is responsible for keeping continuous records and 
providing monthly reports to the DON. A monthly analysis can be made that compares 
current revocation timeframes to past revocation timeframes. This should allow the DON 
the ability to modify the N/MCI contract if the situation warrants. Additionally, the DON 
plans on conducting customer surveys that should provide feedback on how the 
contractor is performing thus supplying the DON with another control measure. 
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V. IMPACTS OF N/MCI 
As discussed in Chapter II the N/MCI contract is the largest outsourcing contract 
the DON has undertaken. Because of the size of the contract, several areas of the DON' 
are affected.   The following provides the reader with an idea of how the N/MCI is 
affecting the DON. 
A.       COST OF CONTRACT 
This thesis analyzes the performance measures for the PKI service level 
agreement. The ability to meet these predetermined agreements will determine the 
amount of incentives the contractor will receive. The tangible and intangible costs for the 
contract are analyzed below. 
1.        Cost of IT Pre N/MCI Award 
Prior to the implementation of the N/MCI (N/MCI will not be fully functional 
until FY 2003), the Navy and Marine Corps funded their IT through their normal 
Operations and Maintenance funds. These costs were never tracked accurately. This is 
due to the fact that commands used other mission funding to acquire their IT 
infrastructure and keep up with the current technology. [Ref. 16] Table 5-1 shows the 
Department of the Navy's estimated IT costs for FY 1996 through FY 2000 (Pre N/MCI): 
Table 5-1. DON Information Technology Costs. [From Ref. 16] 
FY1996 FY1997 FY1998 FY1999 FY2000 
$2,153 $2,294 $2,880 $3,573 $3,632 
(in millions of dollars) 
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As seen from the above table, the estimated IT costs increased 59% over the last 
five years. During the same period, the DON has only increased IT funding a mere 10%. 
[Ref. 16] This considerable difference is attributed to the DON inaccurately forecasting 
IT costs. However, their forecasts were distorted because commands improperly tracked 
their IT costs. Presently, the costs have increased far beyond commands' budgets. [Ref. 
16] All of these reasons support the implementation of an enterprise-wide, common IT 
infrastructure, such as the N/MCI, for the entire DON. 
2.        N/MCI Estimated Budget 
Although exact costs (fixed costs plus incentives) for the N/MCI have not been 
determined - the contract was awarded in October 2000 - the DON did a complete 
estimate prior to award. Their estimate of $1.5 billion annually for all IT requirements 
was additionally verified by the comparable bids they received from the commercial 
solicitations. [Ref. 16] 
The estimated N/MCI budget for FY 2001 through FY 2005 is outlined in Table 
5-2 below: 
Table 5-2. N/MCI Estimated Budget. [From Ref. 16] 
FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 
$256.1* $1,054.3* $1,463.4 $1,463.4 $1,463.4 
(in millions of dollars) 
(*Values are low because N/MCI will not be fully implemented until the end of 
FY 2002, and do not include the Non-N/MCI IT costs) 
The DON plans on distributing the required funding to each command, based on 
its individual IT needs. This will permit the command's IT budget to reflect its entire 
operational IT costs. The DON determines that the N/MCI will save the government $3.5 
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billion over the five-year contract. [Ref. 17] These savings give some justification for the 
DON's decision to outsource their entire information technology infrastructure. 
B. CIVILIAN DON EMPLOYEES 
The DON has identified 1,900 personnel whose jobs are affected by the 
implementation of the N/MCI. The contract requires EDS to allow these people the 
opportunity to be the first to apply for positions under the N/MCI contract. Presently all 
but 326 people have been given positions performing different functions within EDS. 
EDS is also paying a $25,000 signing bonus and a 30% pay increase to anyone joining 
their company with guaranteed employment for three years. [Ref. 17] Since there are so 
many displaced personnel from the DON it is the author's opinion that personnel pose a 
possible security threat. The displaced personnel are the same individuals who will 
manage the DON systems, for the N/MCI contractor, and have ample opportunity to 
inflict possible security breaches. 
C. MARINE CORPS 
Unlike the Navy, the Marine Corps has created a central control network and a 
standard infrastructure throughout its commands. The Marine Corps combined their 
garrison and tactical command, communications, computers, and intelligence systems 
almost 10 years ago. The garrison represents the Marine's nondeployable assets and their 
tactical resources can be compared to the Navy's deployable IT-21 ship-based IT assets. 
Under the N/MCI, EDS will only be responsible for the garrison portion. The Marine 
Corps is concerned that the N/MCI contractor will not manage the garrison's IT 
equipment correctly. Specifically, they are concerned with a possible mismatch between 
the garrison's equipment and the tactical resources. [Ref. 17]   EDS is under rigorous 
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scrutiny by the Marine Corps to provide a seamless connection between the garrison and 
the tactical networks. 
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VI.    CONCLUSIONS 
A.       THESIS SUMMARY 
Chapter II of this thesis provided the reader with an overview of the Navy Marine 
Corps Intranet contract. It analyzed how the N/MCI contract was created and the 
shortened path it took to be awarded. It also discussed the roles of other agencies and 
how they operate within the N/MCI. A further review of the entire N/MCI contract can 
be done by going to the Navy Program Management Office's web site: 
https://nmci.spawar.navy.mil/. 
Chapter HI analyzed performance measures, criterion, and standards. This 
chapter's content focused on the necessary concepts for understanding measures, 
criterion, and thus standards. 
Chapter IV analyzed the PKI performance measure requirements in the N/MCI 
contract. In this chapter, the thesis compared the N/MCI contract requirements to the 
commercial PKI industry performance measures using the characteristics discussed in 
Chapter m. 
Chapter V discussed the specific areas of the DON that are covered by the 
N/MCI, and the cost impact of the N/MCI. 
Appendix A provides a review of the DOD Public Key Infrastructure and the 
related cryptographic PKI issues. If the reader is unfamiliar with PKI issues, some of the 
referenced PKI books in the appendix can be referenced. 
PKI technology has been around in one form or another for several years, 
however, the need for PKI has only recently surfaced. This rise in necessity for PKIs can 
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be attributed to the rise in e-commerce concerns. In the near future, to properly secure 
transmissions over the Internet, the transparent use of a PKI will become part of 
everyone's life. As indicated in chapter II, a PKI is a required security component for the 
new Navy Marine Corps Intranet and is used by the Department of the Navy personnel. 
B. PEFORMANCE MEASURES 
As discussed in Chapter III and IV of this thesis, the commercial industry is not 
monitoring performance measures in the same way that the DON wants EDS to. This 
made the comparison between commercial performance measures and contract 
requirements very difficult. Additionally, PKI is in its infancy, in terms of usage, which 
has contributed to the lack of performance measures for comparison. Commercial 
implementations of PKI have only occurred in smaller companies, which complicates the 
comparison with a DON-wide implementation. However, enough data was collected to 
make an intelligent evaluation of the N/MCI PKI contract requirements. The indicated 
performance measures were, in general, a good start for this contract. Still, as discussed 
in this thesis, there is room for improvement. 
The importance of the DON commands communicating securely through the 
Internet is something that should not be taken lightly. The monitoring of these 
performance measures is necessary to provide a sufficient degree of security and 
hopefully keep our members out of harms way. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
During the writing of this thesis, it was instantly obvious that there was very little 
data, from either commercial vendors or other government PKI programs, for which to 
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conduct a very detailed comparison with the N/MCI requirements. With that in mind, it 
is strongly recommended that a similar PKI performance measure thesis be conducted 
after the first year of the implementation of the N/MCI contract. This should provide 
sufficient time for the contractor to collect actual DON data from their systems. 
Furthermore, the commercial industry is rapidly adapting to PKI for e-commerce, and 
hopefully, within a year, there will be an abundance of commercial data to make a more 
detailed comparison. 
There is also a concern that the N/MCI contractor will install the PKI technology 
throughout the DON without giving the members sufficient training on how to use the 
PKI to communicate securely over the Internet. It is recommended that a thesis be done 
on what, if any, PKI training members are receiving and if it is sufficient to ensure that 
the DON is not creating a bigger security threat with the implementation of N/MCI. 
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APPENDIX A: PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY AND PUBLIC KEY 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
This appendix presents an overview of Public Key Cryptography and Public Key 
Infrastructure.  This overview allows the reader to understand the basis of performance 
measures. A more detailed understanding of these mechanisms can be acquired from the 
list of referenced material. 
A.       SYMMETRIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY: ONE KEY 
Symmetric key encryption, (commonly known as conventional key encryption or 
session key encryption), has been used in the military for almost as long as there has been 
a military. Conventional encryption is based on the sender and the receiver having 
identical keys. This is why it is called symmetric cryptography. With conventional key 
cryptography a message is encrypted with a key and the receiver of the encrypted 












Figure A-l. Conventional Key System. [After Ref. 7] 
Conventional key encryption has worked very successfully in the past. However, 
with the increased use of the Internet, intranets, and extranets to transmit unclassified- 
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but-sensitive messages, the distribution of keys - which is major drawback of 
conventional cryptography - is becoming significantly more difficult. Similarly, if there 
are multiple receivers of a message, each receiver will need a copy of the session key 
used to encrypt the message. Furthermore, if each participant wants to transmit an 
encrypted message of his own, each receiver would need a copy the encryption key. In a 
real world scenario, the number of individual session keys grows out of control and can 
be summarized in a mathematical equation: 
n * (n-l)/2 keys are required for n users. [From Ref. 6] 
There is also a very real concern regarding the security of how receivers and 
senders obtain the keys. This has often been accomplished through sneaker-mail (i.e. the 
transfer of a key by hand-delivery), which allows for a weak link in the security structure. 
Further, as indicated by the formula above, it becomes infeasible to hand deliver 
symmetric keys to a large number of users. This factor limits the scalability of a 
conventional key system. It also limit's performance due to the time consuming hand- 
delivery process. 
In addition to these problems of key distribution and management, conventional 
cryptography cannot support a true digital signature.   The next section illustrates how 
public key cryptography can address conventional key distribution and management 
problems as well as true digital signatures. 
B.       PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY: TWO KEYS 
Public key cryptology was developed by Whitfield Diffie and Professor Martin 
Hellman at Stanford University in 1976. [Ref. 8]    Ronald Rivest, Adi Shamir, and 
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Leonard Adleman, all professors at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, devised a 
set of algorithms that helped popularize Public Key Cryptography. Their system is 
known as RSA, after their last names. This section discusses public key encryption, its 
uses, and its advantages over conventional encryption. 
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Figure A-2. Public Key System. [After Ref. 11] 
Public key cryptography uses two mathematically releated keys, a public key and 
a private key. These keys are not identical, as in conventional encryption, and that is why 
public key cryptography is called asymmetric key cryptography. [Figure A-2] Each user 
is assigned a public key and a private.key that are linked solely to that individual. An 
underlying principle of public key cryptography is that a user's private key must always 
be kept secure. 
The counterpart to the private key is the public key. This key is made available to 
the public. Public key issues are discussed in the Public Key Infrastructure section below 
(Section C). The following sub-sections show how public key systems support the 
security services of confidentiality and digital signatures. 
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1.        Confidentiality 
Confidential is defined in Webster's Dictionary as "containing information whose 
unauthorized disclosure could be prejudicial to the national interest". The goal is to keep 
data secret by preventing unauthorized individuals from reading it. A message sent in 
plain text format can be read by an eavesdropper. Since public key encryption is 
notoriously slow at encrypting data, a hybrid technique that uses both conventional and 
public key cryptography is commonly used. 
When a message is encrypted using this technique, the following steps are 
performed: 
Step 1: A conventional key is randomly generated. 
Step 2: The message is encrypted with the conventional key. 
Step 3: The conventional key is encrypted with the receiver's public key. 
Step 4: The encrypted message and encrypted conventional key are sent to the 
receiver. 
The receiver retrieves the original message by performing the following steps: 
Step 1: Uses his or her private key to decrypt the conventional key. 
Step 2: Uses the conventional key to decrypt the original plain text message. 
2.        Digital Signature 
A digital signature of a message uses cryptographic techniques to provide the 
same properties as a handwritten signature. Digital signatures are now legally binding as 
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a result of recent Federal legislation. A digital signature of a message is created using the 
following steps: 
Step 1: A hash value of the message is computed - (A hash value is a very 
complicated checksum that satisfies the property that if the hash of a message Ml 
is equal to X, it is computationally infeasible to find another message M2, such 
that the hash of M2 is equal to X). 
Step 2: The hash value is encrypted with the sender's private key. The encrypted 
hash value is the digital signature of the message. 
The signature verification process of a digital signature uses the following steps: 
Step 1: A hash value of the received message is computed. 
Step 2: The digital signature (the private key encrypted hash value) is decrypted 
using the sender's public key. 
Step 3: If the hash value in the first step is the same as the hash value in the 
second step, the signature is valid and establishes message authenticity and 
message integrity. [Figure A-3] 
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Figure A-3. Digital Signature. [From Ref. 11] 
a.        Message Authenticity 
If the sender has kept his or her private key secure and if a digital 
signature of a message correctly verifies using the sender's public key, there is great 
assurance that the digitally signed message is from the-owner of the private key. If a 
private key is compromised, digital signatures can easily be forged. Even if a mechanism 
exists for revoking the public keys that correspond to compromised private keys, forged 
digital signatures will be still accepted as valid in the time frame between the key was 
compromised and when the key was reported as compromised. 
96 
b. Message Integrity 
Message integrity is another property digital signatures provide. If the 
digital signature of a message correctly verifies, then the hash of the received message is 
equal to the hash encrypted by the message sender. Since it is computationally infeasible 
to find two messages that hash to the same value, the two messages (the message hashed 
by the sender and the message hashed by the receiver) must be identical, thereby 
establishing message integrity. 
c. Message Nonrepudiation 
A message is nonreputable if the sender cannot deny sending it. If a 
message is digitally signed, the message is nonreputable, because it can be established 
that the hash of the message was encrypted with the sender's private key. Unless the 
sender can successfully argue that someone else has his or her private key, the sender is 
responsible for sending the message. 
3.        Confidentiality with Digital Signatures 
Figure A-4 shows the steps involved in sending and receiving a message 
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Figure A-4. Confidentiality with Digital Signatures. [After Ref. 11] 
C.       A PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE 
A public key infrastructure provides for the management of public and private 
keys. This management involves the secure generation and protection of an individual's 
private key and the authentic distribution of his or her public key. A public key 
infrastructure consists of many parts. The following is a description of the major 
components of a PKI. 
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1.        Certificates and the X.509 Standard 
Certificates were developed to handle the authentic distribution of public keys. 
They contain a public key and personal identification for an individual (or an entity such 
as an organization, account, or site). In essence, certificates provide an association 
between a public key and an individual To protect this association, the certificate is 
digitally signed by a Certificate Authority (CA). [Figure A-5] CAs are further discussed 
in the next section. 
User's PiibKc Key 
user's ID 
ff CA'sPrfeate 
,  Key 
Digitally Signs 
Figure A-5. Certificate. 
Having the certificate digitally signed by a CA gives the user of the certificate a 
sense of confidence that the public key contained in the certificate belongs to the person 
or entity identified in the certificate. The certificate is also issued with a validation time 
period, so that new certificates are required at some predetermined time. The validation 
time period helps ensure that certificates are kept up-to-date and secure. The 
performance metric that measures the time to generate a certificate under the Navy 
Marine Corps Intranet requirements is evaluated in the performance measures section. 
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information 
Version number; an integer, value is "2" for version 3 




Algorithm used to sign certificate (e.g. RSA 
with SHA-1) 
Should not be used 
Name of issuer (X.500 "distinguished name" (DN) that uniquely 
identifies a director object)  
Not Before 
Not After 
When the certificate becomes valid 
Expiration date of certificate 












Subject's signature algorithm 
Parameters applicable to subj. pub. Key 
Subject's public key 
(optional) contains additional information about the issuer (CA) To 
prevent the reuse of issuer name over time.  
(optional) contains additional information about the subject.    To 




Additional info about the certificate 
Algorithm used for this signature 
Should not be used 
ENCRYPTED (certificate hash) 
The DOD has chosen the X.509 Version 3 (X.509 v3) standard as the format for 
its certificate. Table A-l provides a breakdown of the contents of a certificate. 
The X.509 v3 extension fields allow for the addition of organization specific 
attributes. 
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2. Certificate Authorities and Registration Authorities 
The process of generating a private key/public key pair requires a significant 
amount of security. Since the private key is used for digital signatures, it should never be 
exposed to anyone other than the user. The authenticity of the public key needs to be 
protected until the CA signs the certificate. While the CA is ultimately responsible for 
guaranteeing the identity of individuals during the certificate creation process, this 
responsibility is often delegated to a Registration Authority (RA) or a Local Registration 
Authority (LRA). 
3. Certificate Creation 
The first step in all certificate creation scenarios involves the user visiting an 
LRA, RA or CA and providing proof of his or her identity (Military ED, passport, driver's 
license, etc).  The depth of the authentication process depends on the level of security 
required for the certificate.   After the user authentication phase, a number of scenarios 
exist for the key creation process.     Currently, a common process uses the LRA 
workstation to create a user's private and public keys. The LRA then transfers the user's 
private key to a floppy disk for the user and transfers the user's public key, ID, and 
information (via a Secure Socket Layer (SSL) channel) to the certificate authority, where 
the certificate is signed. The certificate is then stored in a certificate directory and can be 
distributed to the user via e-mail or on a floppy disk from the LRA. Future scenarios will 
use smart cards for private key/public key generation and private key storage. The DON 
will issue smart cards to all Navy and Marine Corps personnel by October 2001.   The 
time required for a Navy/Marine Corps Intranet user to have a new certificate created is 
analyzed in greater detail in the performance measures section of this thesis. 
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4. Root Certificate Authority 
Due to the hundreds of thousands of Navy and Marines Corps users that will 
require certificates, it would be impractical for only one certifying authority to distribute 
and manage the certificates for every N/MCI user. To assist in this endeavor, the root CA 
will establish subordinate CAs in a hierarchical structure, with the root CA at the top 
level of the hierarchy. The root CA issues certificates to subordinate CAs who will, in 
turn, use their certificates to issue certificates to members. [Ref. 21] The use of a 
hierarchical structure creates a certification path between the end user and the root CA. 
This method, unfortunately, allows for a major point of failure. Specifically, if the root 
CA's private key were to fall into untrustworthy hands, it would compromise the entire 
system. Since the National Security Agency (NSA) is the root CA for all certificates 
. used by the N/MCI, it will monitor how the N/MCI contractor manages N/MCI 
certificates. 
5. Interim External Certificate Authorities 
The DOD heavily depends on using commercial products and services to conduct 
day-to-day business. This dependency requires that the military be able to communicate 
securely with its suppliers. To support this secure communication, the DOD will use 
Interim External Certificate Authorities (IECA). These Certificate Authorities will 
produce digital certificates for commercial contractors so they may securely 
communicate and contract with the government using the DOD PKI. These certificates 
are used with Electronic Commerce applications in the DOD. [Ref. 22] So far the DOD 
has approved the following IECAs: 
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• Digital Signature Trust (DST). 
• Operation Research Consultants Inc. (ORC). 
• Verisign. 
• General Dynamics. 
6. Certificate Directories 
Certificate directories are an essential element of a PKI.   Many PKI-enabled 
applications require the application to obtain the certificate for another entity. The 
certificate directory provides the repository for these certificates, and for other important 
PKI information such as Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs). Usually, a separate 
directory server is created to keep this valuable information isolated from other functions. 
These directories are typically accessed through the Lightweight Directory Access 
Protocol (LDAP), which runs over Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol 
(TCP/IP). 
7. Trust in a Certificate / Certificate Authority 
With the widespread use of PKI technology in the civilian and military 
communities, it is likely that it will attract the attention of the same undesirable 
individuals the system was created to keep out. There are several scenarios that could 
lead to possible security hazards if the PKI is not managed correctly. The scenario 
described below illustrates a flawed PKI that is not based on certificates. In this scenario, 
users distribute their public keys by posting them on electronic bulletin boards. 
A malicious entity posts a public key on a bulletin board, under the name of 
Alice.  He or she then sends a digitally signed message to Dave pretending to be Alice 
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using a digital signature that was created with the private key associated with the 
malicious public key posted on the bulleting board. When Dave verifies the digital 
signature using the public key on the bulletin board, he will think that the message is 
from Alice. Dave now has a false sense of trust because this public key is not really 
Alice's public key. This is just one example of a flawed PKI implementation. It is the 
responsibility of the N/MCI contractor to ensure that the required security measures are 
taken. The government is responsible for ensuring that the contractor is doing its job. 
SLA 34 performance measures support this responsibility. 
8.        Certificate Revocation List (CRL) 
A certificate revocation list is a list of the certificates revoked due to the loss of a 
user's private key. This loss may be due to a number of problems. It could result from a 
malicious user getting access to another user's private key or it could be something as 
simple as a user forgetting the password that is used to protect their private key on their 
personal computer. The DOD standard for CRLs is X.509 v2. The data fields of an 
X.509 v2 CRL are shown in Table A-2. The DOD is a very transitive community, and it 
is likely that certificates may be canceled routinely. These routine cancellations have to 
be frequently distributed to the entire community so members can ensure the credibility 
of certificates. If there is a long time lapse between when a member leaves and when his 
certificate is added to the certificate revocation list, it could cause a security risk. The 
performance measures section analyzes the revocation process and the time the contractor 
takes to revoke certificates. 
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Algorithm used to sign the CRL 
Any parameters needed 
Name of CRL issuer (X.500 "distinguished name") 
Time 
Time 
Date & time the CRL was issued 
(Optional) date & time of next update 
List of revoked certificates 
Criticality flag If "true" extension must be processed 
Extension parameter 
Issuer's signature 
Serial number Serial number of revoked certificate (unique for the issuer) 
Revocation date Time 
CRL entry extensions 
(optional) zero or more 
extensions 
Criticality flag If "true" extension must be processed 
Extension parameter 
/ 
Another concern caused by having so many transient members is the sheer 
quantity of revoked certificates on the CRL. Every time a member uses a public key, the 
member will have to verify that the key is still valid (i.e. that the corresponding private 
key has not been compromised). Large CRLs will undoubtedly create a time delay in the 
verification process. One approach that can reduce the verification time is to segment the 
CRLs into revocation categories. For example, one CRL might only list routine 
revocations (e.g., user forgot password), and another CRL might list compromised keys 
(e.g., user's key was stolen). These lists could be sent out at different frequencies, with 
the compromised key CRL being more frequent. This way, if the user is only concerned 
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with the possibility of a compromised key, they will only have to verify the given 
certificate using the compromised key CRL. This process will not take as long as 
verifying certificates using a full CRL. [Ref. 12] 
Another problem created by large CRLs is that they take up a lot of bandwidth 
during distribution. This problem can be addressed by the use of delta-CRLs. A delta- 
CRL is a list of the keys that have been revoked since the last time a full CRL or delta- 
CRL was issued. The general scheme will probably be to distribute the full CRLs less 
frequently and issue the delta-CRLs more frequently. 
Another approach to the certificate revocation problem is the use of online 
certificate revocation. Online revocation is similar to credit card verification and 
provides real-time verification that the private key corresponding to a given certificate 
has not been revoked. Online revocation is based on the Online Certificate Status 
Checking Protocol, which will likely be an Internet standard in the future. This protocol 
has two significant characteristics: first, it depends on the emergence of its own three-tier 
(Client - CA - Designated Responder) infrastructure; second, it defines a new set of 
message formats extending beyond those contained in the base PKI X.509 v2 standard. 
[Ref. 15] Even though online revocation may simplify the process of certificate 
verification, it comes with a performance penalty (i.e., network congestion). 
Please refer to the references for additional information. 
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